EP 3 483 299 A1 relates to a steel material for hot stamp forming with ultra-fine grains and a process of making the same, a hot stamp forming process and a hot stamp formed member. It has been published in accordance with Art. 153(4) and goes back to the application PCT/CN2016/098411 published as WO 2018/006490.
Brief outline of the case
EP 3 483 299 A1 was published without drawings. Likewise, no drawings were mentioned in the list of application documents in the European search opinion accompanying the SESR.
The ED decided to grant a patent on the basis of the supporting documents indicated in the communication pursuant to R 71(3).
The applicants submitted that the patent was not granted on the basis of documents approved by them, because it did not contain any drawings.
The applicants appealed the decision to grant.
The applicant’s point of view
The filing of the appeal was justified because the patent had not been granted on the basis of documents approved by the applicants.
The present situation was very similar to those underlying T 1003/19, T 408/21 and T 1823/23. The communication under R 71(3) did not mention or contained any drawings, nor did it contain any reference to the drawings or their removal. The omission of all the drawings did not correspond to the appellants’ requests or to any amendment proposed by the ED.
Approving the text without any drawings had never been the applicants’ “true will”; nor had the ED communicated the text it “truly intended” to grant. Accordingly, R 71(5) did not apply.
Moreover, the appeal fee should be reimbursed, since the patent had not been granted on the basis of documents approved by the applicants. Accordingly, a SPV had occurred.
The applicants also requested a referral to the EBA to ensure a to ensure uniform application of the law under Art 112, cf. Art 20 and 21 RPBA.
The board’s decision
The applicants never agreed to the omission of the drawings, and in particular did not expressly agree to the text intended for grant in the communication pursuant to R 71(3). This distinguishes the present case from the situation underlying T 2277/19, Reasons1.2, and T 2864/18, Reasons 7, respectively.
A line of case law originating from T 2081/16 and T 1003/19 established that the legal consequence of R 71(5), i.e. the deemed approval of the notified text, only applies where the text communicated to the applicant is identical to the text on the basis of which the ED intends to grant the patent, as stipulated in R 71(3), and reflects the “true will” of the ED.
It is thus not sufficient that an applicant, having received a communication formally referring to R 71(3), paid the required fee and filed the required translations. The legal consequence of R 71(5), only arises if the communication sent also complies with the substantive requirements of R 71(3) EPC, i.e. if it actually contains the text in which the ED intended to grant the patent, on the basis of the documents filed by the applicant, possibly supplemented by individual marked amendments.
The absence of any drawing sheets in the communication pursuant to R 71(3) and consequently the published patent, in amendment of the applicants’ request, is a perpetuation of the error which had occurred earlier, i.e. the absence from the European A1 publication of any drawings.
Therefore, the ED did not communicate the text that it intended to grant.
It has been established case law since T 1003/19 that an ED’s error in compiling the documents intended for grant in a communication under R 71(3) that makes a clearly unintentional omission of part of the documents proposed by the applicant for grant as indicated in the applicant’s last request can still be corrected if the applicant files an appeal against the subsequent grant of the patent within the time limit under Art 108, at least if the applicant did not explicitly consent to the incorrect compilation.
Referral to the EBA
A referral to the EBA is not required, either to ensure uniform application of the law, or to align the case law and the Guidelines.
It may be assumed that a convincing body of case law has been established over recent years, and that other boards will in future follow the rationale of decisions T 2081/16, T 1003/19, T 408/21, T 1823/23 and T 1224/24, Reasons1.10, and indeed the present decision.
The board considered that the present decision does not deviate from G 1/10, which found that R 140 is not available to correct the text of a patent, and in support of this agrees with and refers to the reasoning in T 2081/16, Reasons3, and T 1003/19, Reasons 4.
A referral due to a point of law of fundamental importance arising, Art 112(1), second alternative, is not needed.
Criticism of the Guidelines
It may be that the ED refrained from granting interlocutory revision because the Guidelines H-VI do not yet properly distinguish between cases where a mistake was already contained in an applicant’s request or was explicitly approved by an applicant, and cases like the one at hand: where an ED, by mistake and unintentionally, deviated from the appellant’s latest request when listing the documents intended for grant in a communication under R 71(3) and this was neither pointed out to the applicant nor explicitly acknowledged by it.
For the board, a divergence between the Guidelines and the case law of the boards is not necessarily a reason for a referral. Rather, Art 20(2) RPBA assumes that under normal circumstances it is enough to state sufficient grounds to enable the decision to be readily understood, such that the Guidelines may be adapted where necessary.
Reimbursement of the appeal fee
Notwithstanding the applicant’s responsibility to carefully check the text communicated under R 71(3) and to use the possibility provided in R 71(6) to request amendments and corrections, the board found it equitable in the light of the specific circumstances of this case, that the appeal fee be reimbursed.
Comments
Although the present board was aware of decision T 265/20, in which the competent board did not follow the approach taken in T 1003/19 and T 2081/16, it nevertheless decided that a convincing body of case law has been established supporting its view.
It is interesting to note that when the present board speaks about a “convincing body of case law”, the boards were certainly different in their composition, but in T 1003/19, T 2081/16, and in the present case, the same legal member was at work…..
In T 265/20, the board held that the unambiguous wording of R 71(5) does not allow for an interpretation other than the foreseen legal consequence that the concluding step in establishing the final text for grant is the approval of the text by the applicant. Without the applicant’s approval of the text intended for grant, there is no grant of the patent. The board did thus find it right not to follow T 1003/19 and T 2081/16. There are thus clearly diverging interpretations of R 71(5) among the boards.
In T 265/20 and in the present case, the respective boards refused to refer questions to the EBA.
The present decision shows once more that, should a board not being willing to refer questions to the EBA, it will make sure that it is not obliged to do so.
for instance, when looking at the adaptation of the description, there are very few decisions going against the established line of case law requiring adaptation, e.g. T 56/21, and yet the board found it necessary in T 0697/22 to refer questions to the EBA, presently known under G 1/25.
The present decision shows once more that, should a bord not being willing to refer questions to the EBA, it will make sure that it is not obliged to do so.
The question of missing drawings at grant is not a too frequent occurrence, but since it happens and raises problems, it would have deserved a better treatment than a mere criticism of the Guidelines.
It has also to be noted that, in the Guidelines the notion of “purposive selection“, when dealing with novelty criteria of a selection, has been deleted. On the other hand, the “three point test” is not any longer called the “essentiality test”, but is still present in the Guidelines, in spite of many decisions heavily criticising it. First instance divisions are only bound by decisions of the EBA, or those decisions of BA which are quoted in them.
As the applicant waited until the decision to grant was issued to react to the absence of the drawings, it contributed itself to the problem. It could, and should have, reacted much earlier. It is thus not at all manifest that the appeal fee should have been reimbursed, although the original mistake was committed by the EPO. In T 265/20, the appeal was dismissed and the patent published without drawings.
Comments
23 replies on “T 387/25-Drawings missing at grant-Diverging case law”
One additional word of caution:
T 387/25 notes that the applicants-appellants “never agreed to the omission of the drawings, and in particular did not _expressly_ agree to the text intended for grant in the communication pursuant to Rule 71(3) EPC” (par. 1.3 of the reasons; emphasis mine).
When you use MyEPO to respond to a communication pursuant to Rule 71(3) EPC, the system automatically includes a paragraph which starts with “I agree with the text proposed for grant” (or something similar; I am quoting from memory). As far as I know, there is no way to remove this paragraph before signing the response. We can all speculate as to why the EPO made this choice, but if you used MyEPO, it will be much harder to say later that you never actually agreed with the text. It is more important than ever to double- and triple-check the Druckexemplar!
@ Extraneous attorney,
Thanks for your information about MyEPO. Let’s hope it will help reducing the cases in which missing drawings are “forgotten”.
According to T 387/25, the applicant might not have agreed “expressly” to the text intended for grant, but with the mechanism of R 71(5), the agreement is automatic, cf. T 265/20.
It remains that procedural case law is divergent, which is not good for the users of the system.
Here’s another example of the EPO practice of leading an applicant to a certain answer that they find desirable:
The ‘designation of inventor’ form 1002 recognizes only three cases for assignment: (explicit) assignment by agreement executed on a specific date, inventions by employees, and succession by inheritance, and it insists upon a date in case of ‘agreement’.
Yet, hn 99 of G1/22 (and G2/22) states ‘In most jurisdictions, rights to obtain a patent can be transferred without any written agreement or other formalities […] the EPO should adapt itself to the lowest standards established under national laws and accept informal or tacit transfers of priority rights under almost any circumstances.’
Two years after G1/22, form 1002 has still not been amended…..
@ BJ,
I am at a loss to understand what the designation of an inventor has to do with missing drawings in the communication under R 71(3) and the implicit approval under R 71(5).
Applying G decisions by analogy, i.e. in situations they were not thought for, is always a bit tricky. Why don’t you make a suggestion to the EPO that G 1/22 and G 2/22 should be applied by analogy to the designation of the inventor?
I fail as well to see any “EPO practice of leading an applicant to a certain answer that they find desirable”. In the present case, it was the applicant, which, by paying the fee and filing the translations has approved the text. I don’t think the EPO is poised to trick applicant in a situation they do not want.
Case law in the matter is divergent, but to be honest, the applicant, or its representative, contributed to the problem. It had ample opportunities to query the absence of the drawings, but waited until it got the decision to grant to realise that the drawings were missing.
It is a bit like when an applicant realises that with the grant decision, he left a massive problem of added matter in the independent claim. The examiner should certainly not have accepted it, but he wanted to get read of the file, and the representative did so as well, as he wanted to tell his client that he got a patent.
In other cases, where novelty or inventive step are at stake after grant, the proprietor can always file a request for limitation. With added matter in the independent claim, besides an intermediate generalisation, the patent is virtually dead.
Mr Thomas,
I think @BJ was responding to my previous comment, in the sense that some of the EPO’s forms and systems may be seen to “nudge” applicants’ statements towards certain directions, which fit more neatly in the EPO’s boxes than with the applicants’ intentions. I think it was a fair response to my comment. How far the analogy applies can of course be discussed, and you did just that with your response.
@ Extraneous Attorney,
Thanks for your explanation. I have left the EPO now for more than 12 years, but I am rather surprised to hear that some of the EPO forms and systems seem to induce in applicants some specific behaviour in a direction which applicants might not want to go. If I do not want to do something, and even if it is suggested, I will not do it, if I have good reasons not to do so.
For instance R 71 has been amended a few times, as some of its versions could indeed induce some confusion for the not so attentive applicant/representative. The issuance of a new communication under R 71(3) or not was a long discussed topic. This is also the reason why R 71a has been introduced and R 71 trimmed.
The combination R 71(3)-71(5) was introduced in order to save work for the applicant, and for the EPO. That the automatism can have some dear consequences has been shown in the present case.
What I have noticed in my long carrier, is that some applicants do not check what documents are mentioned in the communication, or which amendments are proposed, and are later surprised when they encounter problems.
I have been, and still am the opinion, that applicants should resist any attempt of arm twisting by EDs, by introducing substantial amendments which have not been discussed beforehand with the applicant in the communication under R 71(3).
In principle, only minor amendments, like spelling mistakes are allowed at this stage. I do understand that examiners want to gain time, but this should not be at the detriment of the applicant. Any amendment of substance should not be carried out when issuing the communication under R 71(3).
In view of the points system in force, any intermediate communication, costs time, and brings no points. The temptation to cut corners is thus great. In this respect, it is not the examiners which should be blamed, but the system they are working under.
It should also not be forgotten that, once the applicant has given his approval, the ED does not any longer see the file. The rest of the procedure is carried out by a formalities officer. It is thus very important that applicants check carefully the documents annexed to the communication under R 71(3).
Indeed, Extraneous Attorney.
Thank you for your assistance/explanation to DXThomas
A welcome decision. Regardless of what the case law and rule 71(5) say, there should be no possibility for a patent office to lose drawings that an applicant validly filed and never abandoned, with no recourse for the applicant, while the office shrugs and says “tough luck, should have been more careful”. Natural justice dictates that patent offices must provide ways for applicants to correct their formal errors. The applicant has, in return for a time-limited monopoly, published its secrets for the world to see and the office must be mindful of this. All too often, case law focuses on protecting third parties. Applicants sometimes deserve protection too.
@ Anonymous,
I am certainly happy for the applicant, but as I said in the comments above, the applicant has massively contributed to the problem. Why did he wait until the decision to grant to realise that the drawings were missing? He had many opportunities to realise that the drawings were missing.
The respect of legitimate expectations is a standard way at the EPO to protect applicants/parties, but when they contribute to the situation, it is difficult to apply this notion as simply as that.
It is all very nice to come with the contract theory of patents and natural justice, but the fact that the case law is diverging shows that, even within the boards, the situation is apprehended in different manners, which both have their justification. This is why a referral to the EBA would have been justified.
I would be interested to receive some examples of case law in which the focus was on protecting third parties. In the absence of any tangible examples, it remains an unsubstantiated allegation.
Mr Thomas,
Responsive to your invitation to cite examples of settled case law protecting third parties, I would single out CLB II.A.6.3.4, 11th edition July 2025 : “For the purposes of judging novelty and inventive step, the description cannot be relied on to read into the claim an implicit restrictive feature not suggested by the explicit wording of the claim.”
The previous edition of the CLB contained exactly the same statement.
Mr Hagel,
I am rather surprised at the example you have given. I cannot see that the statement “For the purposes of judging novelty and inventive step, the description cannot be relied on to read into the claim an implicit restrictive feature not suggested by the explicit wording of the claim”, unduly protects third parties. It might protect third parties, in that the latter do not have to dig deep in the description to know exactly what interpretation is hidden in the description for a feature which is clear to the skilled person. After all, this is what claims are for.
If the applicant/proprietor wishes his claim to have a limited interpretation, he should bring in the claim the intended limitation he has given in the description. It is easy for such an applicant to later claim infringement on the basis of the broad interpretation of the claim, but defend the patent against novelty or inventive step attacks, by alleging that his claim should be interpreted narrowly in view of the description. In English one would say, you cannot have your cake and eat it.
The same goes in the reverse direction, i.e. when the applicant/proprietor includes in his claim a clear limitation, which is put into question in the description by statements allowing a broad interpretation. One typical example is the limitation of the claim by adding in the independent claim a feature disclosed as optional in the original description. Once the independent claim has been limited, the optional character of the feature cannot remain in the description.
Later, the proprietor can allege that the claim is protected against novelty or inventive step attacks as it has been limited, but infringement is given in view of the broad interpretation left in the description. This is exactly what happened in the Agfa/Gucci case. In English this is called creating an Angora cat.
In recent decisions referring to G 1/24, the long lasting line of case law you complain about has been maintained. I published a few of those decisions in my blog. I personally think it is right so.
If, when consulting the description, an inconsistency appears due to the variable interpretation of a clear claimed feature in view of the description, this inconsistency has to be resolved before grant, and we have arrived at G 1/25. G 1/24 has actually paved the way for G 1/25.
In spite of what lots of applicants/proprietors would take from G 1/24, the coherence between claims and description has been promoted by G 1/24, but a spade in the claim will remain a spade, whatever might be said in the description.
G 1/24 does by no means allow the applicant/proprietor to feel free to alter the interpretation of a claimed feature which is clear for the skilled person, by having, in the description, statements which would allow either a broader or a more limited interpretation of said clear claimed feature. The description has to be consulted so that the interpretation found in the description can be taken into account when deciding patentability under Art 52 to 57.
The next step, is the removal of any inconsistency between description and claims. If the claim ought to have a limited or a broader interpretation, then the wording allowing the more limited or a broader interpretation has to be brought into the claim, but inconsistencies between claims and description should not be tolerated at grant. By doing so, I cannot perceive any risk of adding matter when bringing claims and description in accordance.
Mr Thomas,
You misunderstood my citation. I never said the settled case law of CLB II.A.6.3.4 « unduly » protects third parties, I think this is just the opposite, the protection of third parties by this case law is entirely justified and I agree with you.
When you said you would be interested to receive some examples of case law in which the focus was on protecting third parties, I had not understood that you were actually asking about examples « unduly » protecting third parties.
I agree that a referral would have been justified.
You say the applicant “massively contributed” to the problem and had “many opportunities” to realise that the drawings were missing. However, the applicant did point out the EPO’s mistake once and was assured that the mistake would be rectified, but the EPO still did not rectify the error and made the same mistake again. When the EPO makes a mistake twice, an applicant should be allowed to make the same mistake once and be excused. I maintain that this is a problem of symmetry, fairness and natural justice.
With respect to the question on third party certainty, I would observe that G 1/22 and G 2/22 arose from boards of appeal focusing on formalistic issues in transferring priority rights in the interests of protecting third parties. This line of case law eventually went too far and needed to be corrected by the enlarged board. The case law on added matter is also focused on protecting third parties and is not in need of correction, because the EPO’s approach to added matter is the most consistent and predictable of any office.
@ Anonymous,
I have difficulties to follow you line of reasoning.
If a third party made a mistake, it is difficult to argue that you should be allowed to make the same mistake in a kind of compensation. It is difficult to consider this as a problem of symmetry and of natural justice.
Try to explain to a policeman that your neighbour has been speeding and was not caught, so that you should also be allowed speeding….
As far as G 1/22 is concerned, please have a look at my reply to BJ and Extraneous Attorney.
@ BJ and Extraneous Attorney,
There is a fundamental difference between the transfer of priority and the designation of the inventor.
I have never understood why the transfer of the priority right had to be carried out before the filing of a subsequent European patent application. As an asset, its transfer, as the transfer of the European application, cannot be bound to a given time limit.
It gave opponents a possibility of attacking a granted patent by making documents published in the priority interval part of the prior art under Art 54(2). This was actually a negation of the protection offered by the priority right to the original applicant as instituted by the Paris Convention.
In this respect, G 1/22 and G 2/22 have been welcome and brought the situation back to the fundamentals of the priority right. It has not cancelled the possibility to query the transfer of opposition, but it made it less easy by instituting a rebuttable presumption.
The designation of the inventor is fundamentally different. The designation of a wrong inventor has no consequences in opposition. The comparison with G 1/22 and G 2/22 is thus not correct.
The designation of the inventor is dealt with in Art 62, 81, R 19-21and R 60.
The moral right of the inventor to be designated is enshrined in Art 62. Art 81 prescribes that the designation shall contain a statement indicating the origin of the right to the European patent.
Irrespective of what was said in G 1/22, Reason 99 (and G 2/22), it is thus necessary for the EPO to ascertain the quality of inventor. There is thus no reason for getting agitated and claiming that in the case of the designation of the inventor should be dealt with like the transfer of priority right.
Any question on the property of an application or the designation of the inventor is not in the competence of the EPO, but that of national courts in the contracting states.
There are thus no reasons to amend Form 1002!
As you say ‘The moral right of the inventor to be designated is enshrined in Art 62. Art 81 prescribes that the designation shall contain a statement indicating the origin of the right to the European patent.’
Indeed, that is the law. My problem is not so much that that is the law but that the EPO (on its designation form) seems to think it all fits nicely into one of three categories (inheritance, dated agreement, and employment).
@ BJ,
I have taken notice of your apparent problem. I do however have great difficulties in following you, when you claim that Form 1002 creates a problem. What other category you think is missing, or what other possibility would there exist in order to be designated as inventor? That the inventor is at the same time applicant? This is not a problem.
If the inventor has given up its right to be designated, there must then exist a contract between the inventor and his employer or the applicant. The EPO does not need to know more.
I know of a company which, for a long time, systematically designated as inventor the proprietor of the company. In view of the great variation in the technical areas of the applications filed by this company, the proprietor could by no means be the true inventor. This was not a problem for the EPO, although it was clear attempt to fool the latter. On top of this, it was manifestly against the national legislation relating to inventors being at the same time employees.
I was interesting to note that, for a long time, this company never started litigation in the US. The reasons for this are manifest. Competitors could easily infringe the corresponding US patents, as they knew that fraud on the designation of the inventor could be fatal to the patent.
The situation has now changed, and the true inventors are now designated. I am not surprised at the reasons of this change of policy.
As far as the application by analogy of G 1/22 and G 2/22 when designing the inventor, I have explained to you and Extraneous Attorney, that the situations are not comparable, and therefore the EPO has to request from the applicant the designation of the inventor. If the Form 1002 is your only gripe, I would say that there are more important issues to discuss.
I would also like to allow myself to give you an advice. You are in general quite quick at jumping the gun, but some reflexion before bashing on the EPO would certainly help you, and at the same time give more weight to your grunges about the EPO.
In a comment you published on IPKat on August 1th, about referral G 1/25, you were most adamant and quoted Art 125 EPC to allege that the EPO “legally has no choice but to conform its practice to what national offices do”.
In this comment, you were of the opinion that the “non-perfect alignment between scope of protection and scope of examination is undesirable. But the contracting states, by means of the EPC, did not allow the EPO to solve this”.
I had to remind you that Art 125 EPC only applies for procedural rules, and only in the case no procedural rule exists at the EPO.
In other words, your tirade against the EPO based on Article 125 EPC collapsed like a house of cards.
I am open to discussing various points of view, and I am willing to accept differing opinions, but they must be based on sound legal arguments.
That we might sometimes have to agree that we disagree, is then part of life’s rich tapestry.
It is correct that I do not agree with the options on form 1002, but I also agree that there are worse problems in the world.
The option(s) that I am missing on form 1002 relate(s) to several issues:
* that there can be a verbal agreement, the date of which has been forgotten by the time form 1002 needs to be filed
* that the invention can follow from development work that took place over time, and that, even if every day an agreement was made that the results of that day’s work were transferred, it is impossible to reconstruct on which date the invention was complete enough to be the subject of a patent application.
* that there can be an implicit agreement between A and B that the results of all work done by A belong to B. An implicit agrement can not have a date, and can later not be proven to have existed, but that does not mean that such an implicit agreement did not exist.
* that it could be that it was a gift from the inventor to the applicant.
In G1/22 the EBA recognized this reality.
In essence, I see cases in which there is no explicit written agreement, and cases in which an agreement of some sort is present, but without a date.
A possible solution could be an extra tick box on form 1002 to the effect that the inventor and applicant agree that a transfer took place in an unspecified manner at an unspecified date in the past.
I agree that (correct) designation of the inventor is important. But designation means only that the named person is recognized by the applicant to be the inventor. And I agree that a statement as in Art 81 should be made. But I do not agree with the implementation that the EPO gives to the law by having only three options for that statement on form 1002.
When you say ‘If the inventor has given up its right to be designated, there must then exist a contract between the inventor and his employer or the applicant’, this is a misunderstanding. I am not talking about cases in which the inventor has given up his right to be designated, only about cases in which the right of the applicant to file a patent application is undisputed, but undocumented.
BJ: you are correct that the wording of form 1002 creates problems and is an example of the EPO’s tendency to want everything to be presented in a specific form when the real world is more complex. Another common scenario can cause issues. An inventor may be employed by company A, which is a subsidiary of company B. The inventor’s rights may transfer automatically from the inventor to A and then an inter-company agreement may automatically transfer the rights to B. Form 1002 does not allow this to be stated clearly.
I concur with the points @BJ and @Anonymous raised regarding Form 1002.
I have even seen a case where a divisional was opposed, in which the box “by an agreement dated” on Form 1002 had been (perhaps incorrectly) filled with a date well after the priority and filing dates of the parent application. The parent application happened to have been transferred before the divisional was filed. The opponents used the divisional’s Form 1002 as one piece of evidence to attack the validity of the priority claim.
Granted, that was a pre-G1/22 case, but it shows that Form 1002 may not be fit for purpose in all circumstances — in which case it could use a box “Other” where the circumstances can be explained, even tersely.
Now, who among us is going to politely ask the EPO to change Form 1002?!
@ BJ and Anonymous,
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the EPO has been receiving applications since the 1st of January 1978. And for every application the designation of the inventor was due. Millions of applications have been received by now, and apparently no unsurmountable problems have arisen when it comes to the designation of the inventor.
If the EPO presently thinks that the present form is sufficient with the three possibilities expressly provided for, I would think it is based on a long term experience. If you think that a supplementary box is needed, why do you not make a suggestion to the EPO?
Therefore, concluding that the EPO has a “tendency to want everything to be presented in a specific form when the real world is more complex” is, to say the least, a bit far-fetched.
As additional inventors can be indicated on a supplementary sheet, I would think that any of the specific situations mentioned can also be dealt with on a supplementary sheet. It is a question of common sense.
According to R 19(2), the “EPO shall not verify the accuracy of the designation of the inventor”. An inventor, in form of a human person, has to be mentioned. For the rest, the EPO is not allowed to forget about the designation of the inventor.
Making a song and dance about Form 1002 is really going overboard.
That in G1/22 the EBA recognised a given reality, is not at stake here.
When you, BJ, are coming back with G 1/22, it shows that you do not have understood why the reality linked to the transfer of the right to priority, is quite different from that linked with the designation of inventor. It is never good to compare apples with pears.
@ Extraneous Attorney,
For reasons given above here, I have welcomed G 1/22 and G 2/22, as it stopped a possibility of attack by opponents, which was not really acceptable, as it boiled down to negate the protection given under the Paris Convention.
But making a song and dance about Form 1002, and accusing the EPO of wanting to ignore reality, is going way too far.
It is up to you, BJ or Anonymous, to ask the EPO to change Form 1002.
Mr Hagel,
I think there was some misunderstanding and by now the situation is clarified.
I am however of the opinion that, should the description contain limiting of broadening interpretations of a claimed feature, which is as such clear to the skilled person, this represents an inconsistency which should be removed.
Hence, the adaptation of the description to the claims should not be left to the whim of the applicant/proprietor.
I hope that G 1/25 will go in this direction.
Third parties should not be obliged to dig deep in the description to see which interpretation is given to a claimed feature in the description. At this rate, then why having claims?