EP 3 628 563 B1 relates to a brake control system of a rail train and a train.
In case of a train separation, measures are provided for still safely braking the part of the train which has been split from the ret of the train.
Brief outline of the case
The OD rejected the opposition and the opponent appealed.
The board held the subject matter of claim 1 as granted lacked N over D1=EP 1 046 564.
The patent was revoked.
The proprietor did not make any submissions in the appeal proceedings and was absent at the OP before the board.
The OD’s interpretation
The OD construed the “malfunction” in feature F as referring to a defect in the primary unit itself and not to a communication issue between primary and auxiliary TBCUs (TBCU = train brake control unit).
The OD further considered that the feature implied a function monitoring mechanism for the primary control unit, which could involve various sensors and diagnostic assessments aimed at verifying whether the primary TBCU was functioning correctly.
The board’s decision
The board held the interpretation of the OD to be too restrictive and agreed with the opponent that feature F can be interpreted in a broader manner.
In this respect, the board noted that the proprietor, by not actively participating to the appeal proceedings, has not provided any arguments to the contrary.
In line with the principles set out in G 1/24, the description and drawings shall always be consulted to interpret the claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Articles 52 to 57 EPC, and not only if the person skilled in the art finds a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation.
In view of paragraph [0041] of the patent, the interruption of communication falls under the definition of feature F. Accordingly, in the event of a train separation, the primary braking unit can no longer brake the separated end section 44 of the train, and this function is taken over by the auxiliary unit 23 of the end car. Feature F is therefore disclosed in D1.
Comments
The present decision confirms the now established case law that a feature should be interpreted in the broadest possible technically reasonable manner, and restrictive interpretations should not be taken into account when interpreting claims when applying G 1/24.
The present decision is a further evidence refuting the arguments put forward in T 439/22 (gathered sheet), that restrictive interpretations found in the description are to be read in the claims.
On the procedure
D1 and the patent at stake bare the same EPC classes B60T 13/66 and B60T 17/22.
In both cases, the EPO search was carried out, inter alia, in B60T and B60L.
In spit of the 8 category Y documents revealed in the SESR for the present patent, it is thus very surprising that D1 was not found during the SESR.
The ISR established by the Chinese patent office only mentioned 6 documents of category A. The ISR was carried out in class B61H.
Comments
2 replies on “T 1249/24-No restrictive interpretation according to G 1/24”
Dear Daniel,
thank you for your continued write-ups of interesting BoA decisions.
While I am a bit late in replying to this post, I hope you can clear up a point of confusion for me:
You write “The present decision is a further evidence refuting the arguments put forward in T 439/22 (gathered sheet), that restrictive interpretations found in the description are to be read in the claims.”
However, as far as I can recall, in T 439/22 the definition as understood based solely on the skilled person’s CGK of “gathered sheet” was “A sheet which was folded and convoluted to occupy a tri-dimensional space. A rolled sheet is not a “gathered sheet”.
Meanwhile, the definition of paragraph [0035] was “As used herein, the term ‘gathered’ denotes that the sheet of tobacco material is convoluted, folded, or otherwise compressed or constricted substantially transversely to the cylindrical axis of the rod.”, hence including rolled sheets and *broadening* the scope by means of a definition inside the ddescription.
This is in line with reason 3.5.2 and 3.5.2 of T 439/22, which to me seem to indicate that the Board favored the broader definition of the patent (reading on D1) over the more narrow definition based on the skilled person’s CGK (not reading on D1).
Do you take from T 439/22 that a term definition inside the description always has to be read into the claim, even if the situation was reversed (i.e. if the skilled person’s understanding based on CGK was broader than the definition written in the description)?
Thanks for your continued and outstanding work,
BR
Dear L.T.,
Thanks for your kind appreciation of my work. It encourages me to persevere.
Your comment is amply justified. My apologies for the mishap. What I wanted to say was clear in my mind, but came out incompletely in my text.
Here is the correct text:
“The present decision is a further evidence refuting the arguments put forward in T 439/22 (gathered sheet), that BROADENING and RESTRICTING interpretations found in the description always ought to be read into the claims.”
The board did indeed, take into consideration the broad definition of gathered sheet found in § [035] of the description, in order to conclude to a lack of novelty of claim 1 as granted.
Without much explanation, the board generalised its statement to also read into the claim a restrictive definition found in the description. See T 439/22, catchword 3 and Reasons 6. second §.
In other words, in T 439/22, the board wanted to bring into the European procedure the position that the patent is its own dictionary. This is the position taken by the German Federal Court (BGH), which is just one national court among all the various national courts in EPC contracting states.
The “EBA’s holistic approach” to claim interpretation in G 1/24, is not to read in the claim what is found in the description, but to merely “consult” the description. The EBA never said what the result of the consultation should be. It follows that the interpretation of G 1/24 in T 439/22 is not conform to the conclusion drawn in said decision.
The EBA expressly refused to answer Question 3 in the referral, cf. T 439/22, Reasons 3.4. This was manifestly not to the liking of the board in T 439/22.
T 439/22 is manifestly at odds with all other decisions of the boards applying G 1/24. According to the case law following G 1/24, but T 439/22, a broad definition in the description can be taken into account when the claim is actually limited, and a restrictive definition in the description is only taken into account if the claim is amended accordingly.
In other words, a broadening or restricting definition in the description may represent an inconsistency between the claim and the description, thereby allowing to shed doubts on the matter for which protecction is sought, cf. Art 84. In this respect, it will interesting to see what G 1/25 will say.
G 1/24 is clear as such, and its application by the boards is now established, but not in the sense of T 439/22.
There is thus no need to reopen the discussion on claim interpretation under G 1/24, as attempted in G 1/26.
I hope I could clarify the issue.