The questions referred in T 0697/22 were the following:
Question 1
If the claims of a European patent are amended during opposition proceedings or opposition-appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description of the patent, is it necessary, to comply with the requirements of the EPC, to adapt the description to the amended claims so as to remove the inconsistency?
Question 2
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, which requirement(s) of the EPC necessitate(s) such an adaptation?
Question 3
Would the answer to questions 1 and 2 be different if the claims of a European patent application are amended during examination proceedings or examination-appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description of the patent application?
The referral and the diverging lines of case law
The first line of case law is that there is a legal basis in the EPC that requires the description to be consistent with the amended claims.
This second line of case law, is characterised as being that there is no legal basis for the refusal of a patent application if there is an inconsistency between any amended claims and the description, caused by the claim amendment. This case law emphasises that Art 84 does not provide such a legal basis.
Four decisions were considered belonging to this second line of case law: T 1989/18, T 1444/20, T 0056/21 and T 2194/19, whereby this line of case law has been most developed in T 0056/21.
Admissibility of the Referral
The Enlarged Board considers the referred questions to be admissible.
In this decision the word “claims” is used where the EBA states general propositions concerning claim interpretation and the legal relevance of an inconsistency, and “amended claims” is used where the EBA addresses the particular procedural situation that forms the subject of the referral, namely where an amendment introduces an inconsistency between the claims and the description, including any drawings.
References to Art 52-57, Arti 83, Art 76(1) and Arte 123 also include references to the respective grounds of opposition under Art 100, and respective provisions of the PCT, where the context so requires.
The relevance of G 1/24
Referring to T 0439/22, Reasons 2.4, the EBA endorsed the holistic approach found therein. G 1/24 is not to be understood as establishing a sequential method under which the claim wording is first construed in isolation and the description and drawings are consulted only at a later stage if uncertainty remains.
Further referring to T 0439/22, Reasons 3.4 and 6, a person skilled in the art reading the claim in the context of the description and drawings will try to take a definition found in the description at face value. As long as the definition is technically reasonable and complies with the overall teaching of the claims, description and drawings, the skilled person will read terms in the claim in the sense of the definition, taking into account both the broadening and limiting aspects.
The meaning of “inconsistency”
Neither the Referral Decision, nor the EPC, provide a definition of “inconsistency“.
For the EBA, an inconsistency between the claims and the description, and any drawings, exists where one or more statements in the description, including the drawings, suggest an understanding of a claim which is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the claim, and that incompatibility cannot readily be resolved by applying the principles set out in G 1/24.
An inconsistency is not established merely because the description, including any drawings, contains a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter.
If, on the other hand, due to such an incompatibility, it is unclear whether a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments do, or do not fall within the claimed subject matter, an inconsistency exists.
Where the description, including any drawings, contains statements that are inconsistent with the claims, and that inconsistency leads to non-compliance with one or more requirements of the EPC, the patent (or application) can comply with the EPC only if that inconsistency is removed (or neutralised), either by amending the claims, amending the description and/or the drawings, or both.
Conversely, where an inconsistency between the claims and the description, including any drawings, is not such as to be relevant for the assessment under the EPC, such an inconsistency need not be removed (or neutralised). The EPC does not require an adaptation of the description, including any drawings, merely for the sake of formal concordance.
Interpretation of Article 84 EPC
The four diverging cases referred to in the Referral Decision as the second line of case law take a view of Art 84 which the EBA does not follow as, amongst other issues, they adopt certain premises that can no longer be maintained after G 1/24.
These decisions proceed on the basis that Art 84 concerns only the claims and that clarity must be assessed without reference to the description. To the extent that this premise excludes the interpretative role of the description, including any drawings, recognised in G 1/24, it cannot be followed.
The EBA was of the view, that a natural reading of Art 84, cannot be said to impose a unilateral directionality that renders the description, including any drawings, irrelevant when inconsistencies compromise the understanding of the claims. For these reasons, the EBA cannot endorse the interpretation of Art 84 adopted in the second line of case law identified in the Referral Decision.
Inconsistency and Article 84
Art 84 does not require a purely formal concordance between the description, including any drawings, and the wording of the claims, nor does it impose a general obligation to remove from the description, including any drawings, all matter not reflected in the claims.
However, applying the above-defined concept of inconsistency, such inconsistency may affect compliance with Art 84. If it is unclear whether information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments are or are not within the scope of the claim, then it cannot be said that the claim is supported by the description, including any drawings.
Inconsistency and Articles 52 to 57
inconsistency may affect compliance with Art 52 to 57. This would be the case when one or more statements in the description, including any drawings, suggest an understanding of a claim which is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the claim, and this incompatibility is relevant for the fulfilment of any of the requirements in Art 52-57.
If a claim has been amended to meet the requirement of non-obviousness in Art 56, but a statement in the description, including any drawings, expresses a technical teaching reflecting the claim before this amendment, and this statement thus conflicts with the fulfilment of the requirement of non-obviousness, this inconsistency in the description, including in the drawings, has to be removed.
Inconsistencies with other provisions of the EPC
The Referral Decision does not address situations which could arise under Art 83, 76(1) and 123. The EBA could not, however, exclude that an inconsistency between the claims and the description, including any drawings, may in a particular case become relevant to compliance with those provisions.
The necessity to adapt the description
The necessity to adapt the description or any drawings is not a consequence of the existence of an inconsistency as such, but arises only where, and to the extent that, the inconsistency has legal significance because it leads to non-compliance with a requirement of the EPC.
An inconsistency having no such legal effect does not require adaptation of the description, including of any drawings.
The answers to the questions
The board answered first Question 3.
The answer is NO. The EBA saw no reasons to treat the proceedings before the examining and opposition divisions differently, and none have been suggested in the submissions.
Question 1
If the inconsistency is such as to cause a non-compliance with the EPC, Question 1 is to be answered “Yes”.
Question 2
Question 2 is to be answered to the effect that the legal basis for any necessary adaptation is the provision of the EPC with which compliance is lacking by reason of the inconsistency in question.
The order
If the claims of a European patent, or patent application, are amended during proceedings before the departments of the EPO, or in appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description, including any drawings, of the patent, or application, and because of that inconsistency Art 52 to 57, 76(1), 83, 84, 123(2) or 123(3) are not complied with, it is necessary to adapt the description, including any drawings, to the amended claims so as to remove that inconsistency.
When to amend the description
Adapting the description, including any drawings, whilst the appeal proceedings are still pending is generally the most efficient course of action in the interests of bringing the legal dispute to a swift conclusion, and is preferable to remitting the case to the administrative instance for the description, including any drawings, to be adapted, which could also result in a further appeal.
Comments
Art 84 works both ways
The EBA has made clear that Art 84 applies both ways, from the claims to the description and from the description to the claims. Claims and description has be be in accordance with one another. This has always been my understanding of Art 84 and I have been trained with this notion.
Definition of an inconsistency
The EBA has given a clear definition of what ought to be considered as an “inconsistency”: one or more statements in the description, including the drawings, suggesting an understanding of a claim which is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the claim. In other words, any statement giving raise to doubts about the subject-matter for which protection is sought cannot stay in the description.
Embodiments not any longer falling under the claims have at least to be marked as such, if not deleted if they are in clear contradiction with the claim wording. I think here at “chromatic/achromatic in the famous Agfa/Gucci case before the UPC.
The description needs to be adapted
The EBA has clearly distanced itself from the position taken in T 0056/21 and the three other decisions belonging to the second line of case law. They are not in conformity with G 1/24. It did thus not help the board to issue T 0056/21 shortly before G 1/24 was issued. T 0056/21 was nevertheless a kind of life buoy for all those refusing the adaptation of the description.
In case of remittal to grant or maintain after appeal
The EBA wants to bring to an end, a classical posture of the boards: remittal to the first instance merely in order to adapt the description. This is a positive move.
In my experience, remitting for adaptation of the description could lead to lengthy discussions before the first instance. As claims and description have to be in accordance with each other, any inconsistency has to be decided in appeal when the wording of the claims is finalised by the board. This avoids a further appeal on the adaptation of the description. Remittal has to allow the first instance an immediate grant or maintenance in amended form.
According to T 2818/19, Reasons 7, amendments to the description carried out by the proprietor during oral proceedings before a board cannot be considered as an amendment of the appeal. Art 13(2) RPBA does not apply to the amended description.
Let’s hope that boards will remember this decision.
T 439/22 and adaptation of the description
In G 1/25, by referring to G 1/24 and T 439/22, the EBA could have been considered has having, de facto, endorsed the view taken in T 439/22 that the patent is its own dictionary.
Reading in the claim the definition found in the description does not mean “virtually” reading into the claim the definition found in the description, but actually replacing the wording in the claim by the definition in the description. If the wording in the claim is not actually replaced, then the manifest inconsistency between claim and description is not resolved.
It ought to be kept in mind, that the applicant/proprietor has the choice to decide whether or not the broadening or the limiting feature found in the description is taken over into the claim. He can also bring the definition from the claim into the description. However, any amendment to the original disclosure has however to be in compliance with Art 123.
Once this choice is made, any inconsistency between claims and description has automatically been resolved. This is a position I have advocated for a long time. I thus maintain that G 1/25 is the logical conclusion of G 1/24.
A historical reminder
In French history, the night of August 4th 1789, is know as the night the privileges were abolished. From September 4th 2026, the privileges patent proprietors could have expected when obtaining a patent at the EPO, by being allowed to leave an inconsistency between claim and description has come to an end.
Comments
63 replies on “G 1/25-The description needs to be adapted to the claims and vice versa”
I have the impression, in pt 46 of G1/25, that the EBA is not pleased of the recent approachs of boards of appeal to refuse new description only because they are late filed.
The EBA consider that there can be a lapse of time between the amended claims and the corresponding description and that the description is ALWAYS finalised in the oral proceedings.
As the inconsistencies can only and effectively be discussed once the claims are accepted, I would believe that the EBA indirecty scolds the boards of appeal for refusing the try to correct inconsistencies for formal aspects. Unless the Boards of Appeal want to now that inconsistency objections be raised at the beginning of the appeal proceeding.
Let’s hope that the Boards of Appeal be more “open-minded” in the future
@ Anonymous,
I think that the EBA has made clear that once the claims are finalised, the description has to be adapted before remittal. This is very welcome.
I am of the opinion that, for any decision of maintenance in amended form by an OD, possible inconsistencies between claims and description have to be raised before the OD. Coming up with such an inconsistency when entering appeal might be too late, cf. Art 12(4) RPBA.
The question which occurs to me, is whether for every AR admissibly filed and maintained in first instance, an adapted description has to filed in first instance or at the latest when entering appeal. There as well a board can still not admit an adapted description under Art 12(4).
It seems however ludicrous to revoke a patent simply because an adapted description to the valid claims has not been filed in due time. Formal aspects should not always prevail over substantive aspects, especially if an allowable set of claims is on file in due time.
This might also put a brake on an inordinate number of AR in first instance.
Some boards have to come back to reality and not simply and look at the substance and not dispose of cases for purely formal reasons for the sake of an increased production/productivity.
I hope with you “that the Boards of Appeal be more “open-minded” in the future”.
The only issue I see is if the Patentee files, for each auxiliary request a corresponding description during the opposition proceeding and during appeal, the Board takes the opinion that inconsistencies remain. A new text will be refused for being late filed even if the EBA consideres that the text is to be finalised during the oral proceeding (it will not be surprising that some board will say that it is an obiter and has no legal force)
@ Anonymous 3
If a board sticks to a very formalistic approach, there is always the possibility of a petition for review after raising during OP an objection under R 106.
I am fully aware that the EBA acting under Art 112a has decreed that discretionary decisions of the boards are not open to review.
This does however not mean that the EBA could not change its position in this circumstance.
I find it interesting that the EBA hereby allows G 1/24 to bring both a limiting and a broadening interpretation from the description to the claim. This seems to overrule what the GL currently say in F-IV 4.2:
“However, when assessing patentability, the description and drawings cannot be relied on to read into the claim a restrictive feature not suggested by the wording of the claim.
If, on the other hand, the description provides a special broad definition of a term used in a claim, the claim must be interpreted in the light of that broad definition when assessing patentability, provided this interpretation is technically meaningful.”
@ KSahu
I can agree with you that the GL F-IV 4.2, which have been amended in 20206 to take into account G 1/24, might have to be adapted further.
If, according to G 1/25, the description has to be aligned with the claims and vice-versa, the applicant/proprietor will have to make a choice. Reading in the claim a definition found in the description, means that the applicant/proprietor cannot choose which definition is valid.
The applicant/proprietor cannot leave in the description a limiting interpretation of the claim of a broad claim as this would manifestly be an inconsistency under G 1/25. Conversely, if the claim is limiting, the applicant/proprietor cannot he cannot leave in the description a broadening interpretation as this would as well be a manifest inconsistency under G 1/25.
It is not for any of us to decide how the GL ought to adapted, but it is manifest that the GL will have to be adapted not only to the G 1/24 but also to G 1/25.
The same applies to the GL B-III, 3.2 also adapted in 2026 to take into account G 1/24.
You say that “Embodiments not any longer falling under the claims have at least to be marked as such, if not deleted if they are in clear contradiction with the claim wording. I think here at “chromatic/achromatic in the famous Agfa/Gucci case before the UPC.”
I do not think the position of the EBA was quite so unequivocal. Certainly, some inconsistencies will need to be removed. However, I do not think all will. Reasons 20 states that “An inconsistency is not established merely because the description, including any drawings, contains a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter. If, on the other hand, due to such an incompatibility, it is unclear whether a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments do, or do not fall within the claimed subject matter, an inconsistency exists.” It is thus only necessary when there is an actual unclarity on whether subject-matter falls within the claimed subject-matter. If it cannot be determined whether an embodiment satisfied the limitations in the claims, that sounds rather like an Art. 84 issue which would anyway need to be resolved. However, if the claims are clear, embodiments that are not within the claims do not cause any harm since as stated in Reasons 20, “The EPC does not require an adaptation of the description, including any drawings, merely for the sake of formal concordance.”
Time will tell. But it is my reading of G1/25 that it will strengthen the resolve of the ED’s to require deletion, or the insertion of a “NOT the invention” statement, as a condition of allowance over Art 84, EPC.
Through the eyes of an EPO Examiner, most every inconsistency will, even more so under the newly-beatified “holistic” approach to understanding the claim, bring doubt as to what the claim covers. And therefore offend Art 84, EPC.
Max Drei, I do not doubt that some will dig in their heels and refuse to change practice. However, the logic is clear. In order for deletion or amendment to be necessary, Reasons 18 sets out two cumulative conditions which must be satisfied: (i) there must be something which suggests an understanding of a claim (n.b. this is more than the mere existence of unclaimed subject-matter, as set out in Reasons 20) which is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the claim, and (ii) that incompatibility cannot readily be resolved by applying the principles set out in G 1/24.
If the claim is clear on the face of it, how can there be real doubt as to whether unclaimed subject-matter is within its scope? The Enlarged Board has given us plenty of ammunition with which to respond to overly zealous requests to amend. The answer to such requests is simple: “An inconsistency is not established merely because the description, including any drawings, contains a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter.” The Enlarged Board tells us that the mere existence of unclaimed subject-matter fails to meet the hurdle of condition (i) before we even move on to attempting to resolve it as part of condition (ii).
@ Anonymous 4
In a preceding reply I drew the attention to Reasons 35: “If it is unclear whether information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments are or are not within the scope of the claim, then it cannot be said that the claim is supported by the description, including any drawings”.
Rather than sticking in a rather formalistic way to Reasons 18 and 20, start reading the whole decision, i.e. also reasons 35 and the actual order.
I seriously doubt that the EBA has given you plenty of ammunition with which to respond to requests to amend. When reading G 1/25, under “overly zealous”, I consider requests which do not give rise to interpretation issues. Any other issue, especially raising doubts about the matter for which protection is sought, represent an inconsistency to be resolved before grant or maintenance.
@ Max Drei,
I agree with you that G1/25 will strengthen the resolve of the ED’s to require deletion, or the insertion of a “NOT the invention” statement, as a condition of allowance over Art 84, EPC. Even if Art 84 is not a ground of opposition, insofar as claims are amended in opposition, adaptation of the description will also be required in opposition.
I do not think that G 1/25 has beatified the “holistic” approach. Reading a feature in a claim means bringing in the claim the interpretation found in the description or vice versa. The apparent inconsistency between claim and description will be resolved by introducing in the claim the interpretation of the description or vice-versa. G 1/25 hs not said that once the different interpretation is virtually read into the claim, everything is settled.
@ Anonymous 2
I am fully in tune with the EBA that inconsistencies need not be removed if they do not affect the definition of the matter for which the protection is thought.
In exactly the same sentence you quoted I read: “If….., it is unclear whether a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments do, or do not fall within the claimed subject matter, an inconsistency exists”.
What is at stake here is not a formal lack of concordance, but a problem of substance as the definition of the matter for which protection is sought is not clearly and unambiguously derivable from the description after amendment of the claims.
The problem at stake here is a massive problem under Art 84. Why do you think the EBA bothered to specify in its decision, Reasons 35, the following: “If it is unclear whether information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments are or are not within the scope of the claim, then it cannot be said that the claim is supported by the description, including any drawings”.
Sticking to Reasons 20 is not giving G 1/25 the full breadth of its conclusions. If the claims are clear, embodiments that are not within the claims do manifestly cause harm, cf. Reasons 35.
In reasons 32, the EBA made clear that it cannot be said that Art 84 imposes a unilateral directionality that renders the description, including any drawings, irrelevant when inconsistencies compromise the understanding of the claims. For these reasons, the Enlarged Board cannot endorse the interpretation of Article 84 EPC adopted in the second line of case law identified in the Referral Decision.
The position you advocate is that taken in T 0056/21. You cannot tell me that the EBA has agreed with this position.
I am certainly not advocating for the T 56/21 approach. I agree that some inconsistencies must be removed. However, I am not selectively quoting one paragraph of the decision. In Reasons 19, the Enlarged Board clearly said that not all inconsistencies must be removed. They state in Reasons 19 that “In many cases, what may appear at first to be such an incompatibility can be resolved without difficulty by applying the principles for claim interpretation set out in G 1/24.” In that case, no amendment is needed.
The key point in the quotes you provided is it must be “unclear” whether a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments do, or do not fall within the claimed subject matter. To justify amendment, there must be some way in which it is “unclear” or there must be some “difficulty” as per Reasons 19. If the meaning of the claim is clear on the face of it, this should not be difficult to ascertain. The skilled reader can observe that the application contains material which does not fall within the claimed subject-matter and they can move on without being “unclear” on the claim scope or encountering “difficulty”.
Where inconsistencies do need to be removed is, for example, when the claim uses a word and the description ascribes an unusual meaning to that word (e.g., T 439/22). This is the type of problem the Enlarged Board is saying must be prevented by amendment.
I’m not so sanguine. The EBA told us that not every inconsistency offends Art 84 EPC. It did this only to put itself on the side of the angels, concerned only with the substance of the law and not with issues that are no more than formal. Its words will have no effect. For the ED’s every inconsistency is a matter of substance.
@ Anonymous 2,
You are really playing on words and apparently you have not understood or do not want to understand what G 1/25 has said. You are actually advocating T 56/21.
According to G 1/25, Reasons 35 and order, it cannot be left to the skilled reader to observe that the application contains material which does not fall within the claimed subject-matter and they cannot move on without being “unclear” on the claim scope or encountering “difficulty”.
Do not tell me if the claim is limited and the description allows a broad interpretation of the claim, that the claim is supported by the description. There is a blatant contradiction between the two statements and the matter for which protection is sought is not properly defined. Those two statements represent an inconstency whether you like it or not.
What is at stake with G 1/25, is not the clarity of the claim as such, but the clarity of the claim in relation to the information found in the description. If the claim and the description tell a different story, the EBA has made clear that that the claim is not supported by the description and this inconsistency has to be resolved.
When the original claim consists of A and B, and is later limited to either A or B, in view of the prior art, you cannot allege that claim A is supported when B is left in the description or claim B is supported when A is left in the description. This is exactly what Agfa did with chromatic/achromatic and was queried by the UPC LD Hamburg. In such a binary situation either A or B has to disappear from the description.
It can well happen that some embodiments are not any longer falling under the claims. Those do not have to be deleted, but they cannot be held to be supporting a limited claim and have to be marked accordingly.
The EBA has not said that if the claim contains a word and the description ascribes an unusual meaning to that word, the description does not have to be adapted. In such a situation there is a manifest inconsistency between claim and description and this inconsistency has to be resolved.
T 439/22 only says that this discrepancy cannot be to the disadvantage of the applicant/proprietor and must be read into the claim. In other words, by incorporating the definition of the word from the description into the claim, the inconsistency between claim and description is resolved. The EBA has not stated that this type of problem can be ignored and the description can be left unamended.
Allowing this type of interpretative summersault is not what the EBA has decided in G 1/25.
You state “The EBA has not said that if the claim contains a word and the description ascribes an unusual meaning to that word, the description does not have to be adapted.” I never made this claim. I believe you may have misread my comment because I am not advocating for T 56/21 at all. In fact, I was giving an example of where amendment IS necessary: “Where inconsistencies DO need to be removed is, for example, when the claim uses a word and the description ascribes an unusual meaning to that word (e.g., T 439/22). This is the type of problem the Enlarged Board IS saying must be prevented by amendment.” (my emphasis)
Here is a toy example.
Description:
The disclosure is about providing colour.
Examples for providing colour are providing green, red, yellow, or blue.
Claim: A method for providing colour
Amended claim: A method for providing colour characterised by providing the colour green
Imho, the description needs no amendments according to G1/25. But it seems the opinions still diverge in this post. An probably not only in this post … 😉
@ Not a bot,
If in the amended claim you select green amongst the three originally disclosed colours green, red, yellow, or blue, you cannot leave the description unamended. All other colours red, yellow, or blue are not any longer covered by the amended claim. This should be pretty manifest.
This corresponds exactly to the considerations in Reasons 35 and 38 and the order of G 1/25.
In all honesty, I cannot share your view that in such a situation G 1/25 allows you to skip the adaptation of the description. Imho, the contrary is true.
While your dedication to maintaining an “immaculate” patent specification is admirable, your reading of the “toy example” seems to bypass the central compromise the Enlarged Board of Appeal just struck in G 1/25. In your recent comment, you argue that because the colors red, yellow, and blue are no longer covered by the amended claim, the description must automatically be amended to remove them. This echoes the broad consistency requirement you have consistently championed. However, if this strict one-to-one mapping were still the rule, the EBA would not have spent several paragraphs deliberately raising the threshold for what actually necessitates an adaptation.
The “toy example” likely does not require adaptation under the new G 1/25 framework because the decision explicitly permits the retention of unclaimed embodiments. G 1/25 states unequivocally that a relevant inconsistency is “not established merely because the description… contains a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter”. The mere presence of red, yellow, and blue in the description no longer triggers an automatic deletion just because the claim was narrowed to green. Furthermore, the decision specifically dismantled the practice you are advocating for, ruling that Article 84 EPC “does not require a purely formal concordance between the description… and the wording of the claims, nor does it impose a general obligation to remove from the description… all matter not reflected in the claims”.
You point to Reason 35 to justify amending the toy example, but that clause is strictly conditional. Reason 35 only applies if it is “unclear whether information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments are or are not within the scope of the claim”. In the toy example, there is zero lack of clarity. Any skilled reader knows immediately that a red example does not fall within the scope of a claim strictly limited to green.
Ultimately, the EBA went out of its way to establish that adaptation is “not a consequence of the existence of an inconsistency as such, but arises only where, and to the extent that, the inconsistency has legal significance”. If your interpretation were correct, that any unclaimed embodiment left behind automatically requires adaptation, the EBA’s entire exercise in defining a relevant inconsistency as something that must cause actual non-compliance with the EPC would be pointless. Under G 1/25, mandatory adaptation is meant to be the exception to cure genuine contradictions, not an automatic administrative rule applied every time a claim is narrowed.
The trouble with hypotheticals is that they over-simplify and so hinder rather than help debate. The public, including those investing in new technology, need to know what the claim covers (Art 69 EPC). The boundary between what is green and what is blue is diffuse. Everybody has a different opinion.
So, in your description supporting your narrowwed claim to green, Is it to be left unsaid, whether or not the claim neverthelss “covers” what some would see as blue? Or is “blue” to be deleted or labelled “not the invention”?
In general, stepping away now from hypotheticals, a requirement to conform the description will help the public by making it a little bit clearer what the claim covers and what not. Presumably this consideration was what drove the EBA (including its external members) to decide the way they did. And presumably this is what many patent-owning litigants don’t like about it.
You can construe the decision any way you please, but what counts is what EPO Examiners are told to do, by The Guidelines. My money’s on a further tightening of the conformity ratchet.
@ Max Drei-05.09.2026
I agree with you that hypotheticals can be over simplifying. I want nevertheless to precise my thouhts.
If the colour green has been selected among the 4 originally disclosed colours, in order to overcome an objection of patentability, N or IS, then the other 3 have to be deleted. They do not correspond to what is claimed.
If the colour green has been selected among the 4 originally disclosed colours, not in order to overcome an objection of patentability, N or IS, then the other 3 do not have to be deleted, although they are not claimed. They do not correspond to what is claimed, but they do not harm.
It would indeed not be fair towards the applicant/proprietor to force him to delete the other 3 colours. One never knows what can happen later in the life of the patent. In order to keep open all possibilities for the proprietor, I would never have required the deletion of the 3 other colours.
A requirement to conform the description, when it is necessary, will help the public by making it a little bit clearer what the claim covers and what not. Many patent-owning litigants don’t like is to be forced to clarify the situation. With the decision as it stands, they have no chance to escape it.
@ who knows! About the toy example
As far as the “toy” example is considered, I refer to my comment to Max Drei.
I will repeat it here for your benefit.
If the colour green has been selected among the 4 originally disclosed colours, in order to overcome an objection of patentability, N or IS, then the other 3 have to be deleted. They do not correspond to what is claimed. This should be abundantly clear for any person working in the patent field.
If the colour green has been selected among the 4 originally disclosed colours, not in order to overcome an objection of patentability, N or IS, then the other 3 do not have to be deleted, although they are not claimed. They do not correspond to what is claimed, but they do not harm.
It would indeed not be fair towards the applicant/proprietor to force him to delete the other 3 colours. One never knows what can happen later in the life of the patent. In order to keep open all possibilities for the proprietor, I would never have required the deletion of the 3 other colours.
There was thus no reason for you to become so vehement.
The position I have expressed above here, is totally in compliance with G 1/25. What else do you need?
I do however hasten to add, that a situation as the second one, no need to amend, will in my opinion, be rather the exception than the rule. Your are holding on § 19 and co like holding to a life buoy, as most of the drafters of amicus curiae did with T 56/21.
Whether you like it or not, the description will have to be adapted if the adaptation is required
(i) in view of a proper definition of the matter for which protection sought, or
(ii) if the claim has been limited in view of an objection of lack of N or IS.
In such situation (ii), embodiments not any longer encompassed by an amended claim will have to be marked accordingly. I would not necessarily require deletion of those embodiments, but the description cannot be left with the impression that all embodiments represent the claimed technical teaching.
If there are only two originally disclosed embodiments, then the one not any longer encompassed by the amended claim has to be deleted. This is what should have been done before grant in the famous Agfa/Gucci case. Even the CFI UPC LD Hamburg complained that this had not been done.
Would you claim that leaving the embodiment novelty stricken can be left in the description? If this is the case, you better read carefully G 1/25 once more and not stop at the first half of the decision.
I struggle to see how you are extracting a mandatory deletion requirement for N or IS amendments from paragraph 35 of G 1/25. You argue that if a feature (like “green”) is selected to overcome an N or IS objection, the other embodiments (like “red” or “blue”) must be deleted because they no longer correspond to the claim.
However, paragraph 35 makes no distinction whatsoever regarding the prosecution history or the underlying reason a claim was amended. Paragraph 35 explicitly states that support under Article 84 EPC fails only “If it is unclear whether information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments are or are not within the scope of the claim”. The operative word here is “unclear.” In the toy example, there is absolutely no lack of clarity; any skilled reader knows immediately that a red embodiment falls completely outside a claim expressly limited to green. Since there is no unclarity regarding the scope, there is no failure of support under paragraph 35. Your dichotomy, at least to me an probably shared by many others, that N/IS amendments require deletion while voluntary amendments are harmless, simply does not exist in the text of the Enlarged Board’s decision.
Furthermore, how would your theory apply to non-unity objections? If a claim is restricted solely to address a lack of unity, the unsearched and unclaimed embodiments are similarly left outside the claim scope. Paragraph 35 still only triggers an adaptation requirement if the presence of those non-unitary embodiments creates genuine unclarity, not merely because they were abandoned to satisfy procedural requirements.
This brings us to the EPO Guidelines for Examination, specifically F-IV, 4.3. Do you truly believe these guidelines can survive without a substantial and fundamental revision? Currently, F-IV, 4.3 dictates that parts of the description “not encompassed by the wording of the claims are inconsistent” and mandates that applicants must remove these inconsistencies either by deleting the embodiments or explicitly marking them. Yet, G 1/25 explicitly overrules this standard in Reason 20, declaring that “An inconsistency is not established merely because the description… contains a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter”. The Enlarged Board further solidified this in Reason 22, stating that “The EPC does not require an adaptation of the description… merely for the sake of formal concordance”.
Given that G 1/25 expressly permits the retention of unclaimed embodiments and explicitly rejects the pursuit of purely formal concordance, it seems inevitable that the rigid, automatic mandates of F-IV, 4.3 will have to be dismantled. As always happy to read your thoughts.
@ Anonymous 2
In a previous comment you wrote “I am not selectively quoting one paragraph of the decision” but in the same breadth you mention Reasons 19. This does not look very coherent.
When you consider that. “when the claim uses a word and the description ascribes an unusual meaning to that word (e.g., T 439/22)”, I take that you agree with my view that applying G 1/24 allows to resolve the uncertainty by replacing the word in the claim by the definition in the description.
In the meaning of T 439/24, now confirmed in G 1/25, “reading” the definition of the description into the claim cannot not mean merely to “virtually read” the definition of the description into the claim, but actually necessarily means replacing the word in the claim by the definition in the description.
By only “virtually reading” the definition in the description into the claim, the inconsistency between claims and description is not resolved. I therefore also maintain that the patent cannot be its own dictionary, as then the inconsistency between description and claim is not resolved.
In that respect I do agree that you do not advocate T 56/21. You nevertheless try to minimise the requirement leading to a necessary adaptation of the description by insisting on Reasons 19 and the like.
It is great to read your thoughts on the outcome of G 1/25. As expected, your view remains consistent with the position you advocated in your amicus brief, which strongly favoured a strict requirement for description adaptation to ensure the legal certainty.
However, many in the industry, particularly the large majority of users who argued against a blanket mandate for these amendments, are reading the decision very differently. What seems clear is that the strict vision recently enforced by the EPO, which your brief aligned with, is not what the EBA ultimately wrote in black and white.
Although I don’t believe EPC provides the basis for amending the specification, I have to accept the decision. While the EBA did conclude that Article 84 EPC can work “both ways” in certain circumstances, they explicitly rejected the strict approach of the past few years. To understand how the requirement that claims “be supported by the description” functions under G 1/25, it helps to look at an analogy: building a house.
In construction, a house (the claims) is built upon a foundation (the description). The foundation provides the necessary structural support, but it does not have to perfectly mirror the perimeter of the walls above ground. A foundation might extend further out into the yard to form a patio or an extra concrete slab (representing unclaimed technical teachings or embodiments). Just because that extra concrete exists outside the footprint of the house does not mean the house itself is unsupported.
This structural reality maps directly onto G 1/25. The EBA explicitly ruled that an inconsistency is not established merely because the description contains technical teachings, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter. Furthermore, the EPC does not require an adaptation of the description “merely for the sake of formal concordance,” nor does Article 84 impose a general obligation to remove all matter not reflected in the claims.
Returning to the analogy, a failure of support only occurs if the foundation actually contradicts the blueprints—for instance, if it leaves the builder in “real doubt” about the layout, suggesting a structure that is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the house plans.
From a practical standpoint, this means the “bulldozer approach”, where examiners automatically force applicants to delete or prominently mark all unclaimed embodiments just because claims were narrowed during prosecution, is no longer appropriate. I am personally very happy that G 1/25 clarifies that amendments to the specification are only necessary if an inconsistency creates genuine, unresolvable doubt that directly causes non-compliance with the EPC
@ Who knows !
I respect your position, but it will not come as a surprise that I do not share it. I acknowledge that you find my position coherent with what I have said in my amicus curiae. I was indeed among the few finding that that the description has to be adapted to the claims.
I have been confronted before with the notion that the claims are equated with a house and the description is equated with the foundations.
The foundations and the house are very large at filing. During prosecution, in view of the prior art, the house has to be restricted in its size. If this is the case, the foundations cannot stay as large as they were originally and the foundations can thus not be considered to still support a house reduced in size.
Have you ever seen a house in which the foundations do not perfectly mirror the perimeter of the walls above ground. I have not. A house sitting on foundations which are not commensurate with the amended dimensions of the house above ground would lack any stability and might even collapse.
I agree that the EBA explicitly ruled that an inconsistency is not established merely because the description contains technical teachings, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter. This is what is said in Reasons 19. I have no problems with this position.
However, in only looking at Reasons 19, you wilfully turn a blind eye to Reasons 35 and 38. Those reasons say very clearly that the claims ought to be supported by the description and that the part of the description not supporting the inventive teaching derivable from the claims has to be amended. This means that the foundations have to match the house above ground. Your example of the house can turn around in a way which is not in your favour.
The EPC might not require an adaptation of the description “merely for the sake of formal concordance,”. I can fully agree with this stance. Art 84 might in your opinion not impose a general obligation to remove all matter not reflected in the claims. However, if the claims have to be supported by the description, and the description should not give the impression that matters not inventive are still covered by the description your position is not tenable from a mere logical point of view.
I have never been for a bulldozer approach as you claim, but the patent granted or maintained by the EPO has to be valid in all the contracting states of the EPC, with all their different judicial traditions and case law. The EPO cannot therefore indulge in granting or maintaining patents in which the foundations do not match the actual house. What jurisdictions acting in post grant or post opposition procedures do with the patent is beyond the reach of the EPO and cannot dispense the latter to deliver patents in which the proprietor cannot play around with various definitions in the description and in the claims at the whim of the proprietor.
G 1/25, and G 1/24, have certainly clarified the situation. I do however fear that it is not in the sense you wish.
The EBA ultimately wrote in black and white that inconsistencies affecting the support of the claims and/or giving raise to doubts about what is the inventive teaching of the claims are not any longer tolerable. I certainly read and conclude something quite different from what you seem to conclude from G 1/25.
I will need much more compelling arguments if you want me to align my position with yours. Your presentation of G 1/25 reminds about the glass being either half empty or half full. At filing the glass is quite full. During prosecution the content of the glass diminishes, but what matters is the content, not the air above the liquid.
Daniel, help me, can you: I don’t want to be difficult but there is something in the Decision which I don’t understand.
Look at para 33. There it speaks of “the meaning” of the claim. Now look at para 35. Here it speaks of the “scope” of a claim. The word “scope” connotes the scope of protection, right? Scope of protection means Art 69, EPC, right.
Am I to understand that “scope” is wider than “meaning”? Or are these two words for the same thing? Why does the Decision never mention Art 69 EPC? Is it irrelevant to the three questions considered by the EBA? If so, why did they use the word “scope” in para 35?
Max Drei-05.09.2026-2
My explanation of the absence of any mention of Art 69 in G 1/25 is to be seen in G 1/24. In G 1/24, the EBA made clear that, in essence, Art 69 only applies before national or supranational jurisdictions. Art 69 cannot be used to interpret the claims.
The word “meaning” in para 33 appears purposedly chosen as in G 1/24, the EBA also decided that, as such Art 84, cannot be used when interpreting a claim. The result was that the description should be “consulted” when interpreting the claim, but the EBA never said in G 1/24 what should be the result of said consultation. My guess is as good as any other guess, simply boils down to detect any inconsistency in the original disclosure. .
The use of the word “scope” in para 35 can, at a glance, be considered unfortunate. As in Art 84 it is held that the claims define the matter for which protection is sought, it would equate “scope” with “the definition of the matter for which protection is sought”.
This is very personal view, but it’s the only logical explanation which came to mind.
Can’t quarrel with any of that. Thanks Daniel
G 1/25 beefs up GL F-IV.4.3 (2024 revision) which defines “inconsistency” as follows :
“Any inconsistency between the description and the claims must be avoided if it casts doubt on the subject-matter for which protection is sought and therefore render the claim unclear or unsupported under Art. 84, second sentence, or, alternatively, render the claim objectionable under Art. 84, first sentence.”
The wording “if it casts doubt” of the 2024 revision replaced the wording “if it could throw doubt” of the previous version. It was indeed meaningful to replace a conditional by the present tense. This made it clear that the onus is on the ED or OD to prove the need to remove an inconsistency. It was no longer possible to rely on hypotheticals as was possible under the “if it could..” language or on a mere reference to the Guideline devoid of substantiating reasoning.
The “real doubt” language of G 1/25 implies that the burden of proof will be stronger.
In addition, alongside the 2024 revision of the GL, the EPO’s practice of entering substantial amendments of the description at the 71(3) stage without prior consultation with the applicant was put to an end. G 1/25 pins another nail to the coffin by requiring that the issue of description amendment be handled as part of the assessment of the EPC conditions.
All in all, it seems to me the message is that substantial description amendments should not be considered except if there is a clear need based on substantiated reasoning. This would be wise for procedural efficiency and for avoiding potential 123(2) issues.
Good points. Now I see why the Board chose the word “real”, as opposed to”serious”.
Mr Hagel,
I can agree with you in substance. That adaptation of the description is, under G 1/25, part of the assessment of requirements of the EPC at large, should put an end to this practice at the R 71(3) stage.
Whenever an ED or an OD requires the adaptation of the description, reasoned grounds have to be raised. A mere reference to Art 84 on Form 2035 has never been a proper argumentation under R 111(2).
I refer further to my comments to Max Drei when he mentioned the hypothetical “toy” example.
On the basis of that example, I gave the reasons why the selection of green on the applicant’s/proprietor’s own volition would not require any amendment of the description. When the selection of green overcomes a N or IS objection, then matter for which protection is sought is only green, and the other three colours have to be deleted. This is rather coarse approach as it also depends what has been disclosed in the original description.
I have always been against amendments to the claims or to the description at the R 71(3) stage, unless the amendments had been agreed previously, for instance by phone, with the applicant or his representative.
This “provisional” agreement had the to be consigned on Form 2035. If this was not the case, I brought the file back to the chair of the division.
The agreement was in any case merely “provisional” in that the applicant and/or his representative could always rescind the agreement.
The time spent by EDs for giving good reasons for adapting the description will most probably be recouped to a certain extent, as now the boards have the obligation, albeit only in form of an obiter dictum; to check the adaptation of the description before remitting to the first instance in order to grant or maintain in amended form.
@Who knows ! comment dated 6 September:
You have summed it up as clearly as possible. The vast majority of commentary on G 1/25 is seeing it as a weakening of the EPO’s stance. Paragraph 35 is saying that if the description casts doubt on the claim scope to such an extent that it cannot readily be determined if the claim is patentable, then remedial action must be taken. It absolutely is not saying that every amendment to ensure patentability necessitates description amendment.
Regrettably, I believe the EPO and the boards will read G 1/25 in the same way as this blog. After all, this blog, the EPO and most boards tried to ignore G 1/24 and insisted G 1/24 did not prescribe a holistic approach when it clearly did. The Enlarged Board has a frustrating habit of saying enough to make its intentions largely clear to most of us while leaving the EPO and boards with enough leeway to ignore what was said. I expect the Enlarged Board in G 1/26 will have to reiterate the message from G 1/25, or perhaps we might need a further referral in future on what the content reference to “unclear” mean in G 1/25.
@ Anon.-06.09.2026
I am not surprised by your comment. But it is as pointless as today’s comment of Who knows !
The vast majority of amicus curiae were against adapting the description. They clung to T 56/21 and alleged that Art 84 only applies to the claims and not to the description in combination with the claims, i.e. to the basic form of holistic approach.
Those amicus curiae did not withhold the EBA to specify that in order to comply with the requirements of Art 52 to 57, 76(1), 83, 84, 123(2) or 123(3), the description needs to be adapted. It also did not withhold the EBA to specify that Art 84 applies both ways.
Most boards did not try to ignore G 1/24. As the EBA has not given instructions about the result of the consultation, they interpreted it as best they could.
Contrary to what you allege, para 35 is very clear, in that it says that every amendment to ensure patentability necessitates the description to be amended. The definition of the matter for which protection is sought cannot be different in the claim than in the description. The proprietor cannot be allowed to come up with a different interpretation of the claims, when looking at the claim, and looking at the description.
When now the EBA has stated that the definition found in the description has to be read into the claim, the situation is clarified. “Reading” the definition of the description into the claim, does not mean “virtually reading” the definition of the description into the claim, but actually means replacing the definition in the claim by that found in the description.
Leaving different definitions in the claim and in the description of the matter for which protection is sought would not resolve the manifest inconsistency between claim and description. This is however what lots of people would like to do, as it allows later to choose the definition which suits them best depending on the situation. The Angora cat is lurking at the corner.
By actually writing in the claim the definition found in the description, the inconsistency between claim and description is resolved and description and claims are automatically aligned with one another. When the boards in applying G 1/24 said that they did not want to play interpretative summersaults, they actually took into account the fact that the applicant/proprietor was refusing to write in the claim the definition given in the description of the matter for which protection is sought.
Your comment about the EBA and the boards is totally unfair. I nearly deleted this part of your comment. The EBA has to be careful and avoid to be too prescriptive. Lots of various situations can occur and the EBA cannot foresee all of those.
We first had G 1/03 about undisclosed disclaimers and then G 2/10 about the gold standard when it comes to added matter. Some boards happily combined G 1/03 and G 2/10, so that undisclosed disclaimers were not any longer possible. I was flabbergasted when I saw this happening. With G 1/16, the situation was clarified: G 1/03 and G 2/10 cannot be applied successively.
In G 1/25, the EBA has now clarified how the different definitions of the matter for which protection is thought, boards will now better know what to do when they consult the description. If the definition of the description is written into the claim, they now know how to apply G 1/24 and G 1/25. It is certainly not envisaged that different definitions of the matter for which protection is sought are left untouched and allow the applicant/proprietor to decide at its whim which interpretation is valid.
I am still not convinced that G 1/26 is at all admissible when looking at G 1/24 and G 1/25.
You place great emphasis on paragraph 35. Are you able to explain why you ignore the word “unclear” in paragraph 35? This was the only time the enlarged board gave an example of where support might necessitate description amendments and it was qualified with the “unclear” requirement. This seems to be the main point of disagreement between you and most commentators.
@ Anon-06.07.2026-2,
When you read paragraph 35 and you apply a holistic approach to it, you have to look at the whole of the paragraph and not single out one item out of its context. The term “unclear” in said paragraph 35 is pretty “clear” (sorry for the pun) in its meaning for anybody with a mind willing to understand what said paragraph is telling.
If any information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments are not within the scope of the claim, then it cannot be said that the claim is supported by the description, including any drawings. I do equate “scope” with “the definition of the matter for which protection is sought”.
If any information, examples, subject-matter or embodiments are within the scope of the claim, then it can be said that the claim is supported by the description, including any drawings. Here as well, I do equate “scope” with “the definition of the matter for which protection is sought”.
The term “unclear” in paragraph 35 is not aimed at a possible lack of clarity of the claim as such, but at the other part of Art 84, relating to the support of the claims by the description.
Embodiments which are not any longer encompassed by the amended claim in view of an objection of lack of N or IS, cannot be held to be supporting the amended claim as required under Art 84.
Is this so difficult to understand? If your answer is yes, you better look for a job outside the patent world.
You state that “The term “unclear” in paragraph 35 is not aimed at a possible lack of clarity of the claim as such, but at the other part of Art 84, relating to the support of the claims by the description.” I agree paragraph 35 relates to support. However, it is defining what must happen in order for an inconsistency to lead to a lack of support. Your statement overlooks that the enlarged board used the word “unclear” twice in its decision and also referred to “real doubt as to the meaning of the claim”. Not only is “unclear” used in paragraph 35 to define when an inconsistency might lead to a lack of support, but this concept appears in paragraphs 19 and 20 where the enlarged board defined an inconsistency that needs amendment. The definition of an inconsistency that needs amendment is one where there is “real doubt as to the meaning of the claim” and “it is unclear whether a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments do, or do not fall within the claimed subject matter”. Clarity is fundamental to the test for inconsistency under G 1/25 and nothing you have said addresses this point.
I note also that the enlarged board observed in paragraph 19 that “In many cases, what may appear at first to be such an incompatibility can be resolved without difficulty by applying the principles for claim interpretation set out in G 1/24”. From my understanding of your position, and please correct me if I am wrong, you advocate for removal of all inconsistencies. That approach would seem to render paragraph 19 obsolete.
My position is consistent with the majority of firms commenting on the decision so perhaps most practitioners need to look for jobs outside the patent world. In any event I do not think ad hominem attacks are productive.
@ Who knows !-06.09.2026
If you struggle to see how I am extracting a mandatory deletion requirement for N or IS amendments from paragraph 35 of G 1/25, it is your problem, not mine.
I don’t not think that you belong to the category “as thick as two planks”, but there seems to be a kind of scissor in your brain.
If a feature like “green” has been selected to overcome a N or IS objection, the other embodiments, like “red” or “blue”, MUST be deleted because they no longer correspond to the definition of the matter for which protection is sought. Green, red or blue are clear as such, but there is an inconsistency between the claim and the description. This is the type of inconsistency which falls under § 35 of G 1/25.
Leaving “red” or “blue” without any comment in the description if the claim has been limited to “green” in view of the prior art, would allow the proprietor to later claim that “red” and/or “blue” still fall under the definition of the matter for which protection is sought, although only “green” deserves protection in view of the prior art.
Let us come back to the example of chromatic/achromatic in EP 3 388 490 B1. The original claim 1 related to a manufacturing method for decorating natural leather…. applying on a crusted leather (45) a base coat (44) containing a pigment for providing a “chromatic” colour OR an “achromatic” colour.
The subject-matter of original claim 1 was anticipated by D1. In view of D1, the applicant deleted the option of a “chromatic” colour for the basecoat.
Claim 1 as granted relates thus to a manufacturing method for decorating natural leather ….. applying on a crusted leather (45) a base coat (44) containing a pigment for providing an “achromatic” colour.
“Achromatic” and “chromatic” are comparable with the “green” and “red” colour in the example we are discussing. If you now allege that “chromatic” is still encompassed by the granted claim, you have a major problem, but then, I cannot help you.
In its decision, Agfa/Gucci, UPC_CFI_278/2023, the CFI LD Hamburg construed the feature “achromatic” according to the definition given in the description in para. [0021]. It held that “achromatic” and “chromatic” colours are mutually exclusive as “chromatic” colours have a dominant hue. As a consequence, the embodiment described in para. [0029] has fallen out of the granted claim 1, because it would have led to a “chromatic” colour in the sense of the patent.
The court considered that there “are several passages mentioning “chromatic” in the specification of the patent that should have been deleted”, to conclude that it is immediately apparent that the SPECIFICATION is NOT CONSISTENT with the granted claims.
To sum it up. The court has, de facto, consulted the description as required by G 1/24, and also realised that the description is not consistent with the granted claims, i.e. has, de facto, applied G 1/25.
If a claim is restricted solely to address a lack of unity, the unsearched and unclaimed embodiments are left outside the definition of the matter for which protection is sought and not merely from the scope of the claim. All parts of the description relating to the non-unitary part can be left in the description, but the description has then to be adapted so as to make clear that they are not any longer encompassed by the definition of the matter for which protection is sought in the claim.
If you allege that paragraph 35 only triggers an adaptation requirement if the presence of those non-unitary embodiments creates genuine unclarity, not merely because they were abandoned to satisfy procedural requirements, then you have not understood what G 1/25 is about.
The non-unitary embodiments might be clear as such, but there is a manifest inconsistency between the actual subject-matter of the claims and the description. It has to be made clear that the non-unitary embodiments do not correspond to the definition of the matter for which protection is sought.
By not clarifying the situation with respect of the non-unitary embodiments, the proprietor could later argue that the non-unitary embodiments are still encompassed by the granted claim.
Coming back to the Agfa/Gucci case, this is exactly what Agfa has tried to do and claimed against all odds that “chromatic” was still part of the definition for which protection was sought. In other words, Agfa created a nice Angora cat. The court held that “chromatic” was not part of the claimed invention and the Angora cat deflated as quickly as it was inflated.
If, cf. paragraph 38+39, a claim has successfully been amended to meet the requirement of non-obviousness in Art 56, but a statement in the description, including any drawings, expresses a technical teaching reflecting the claim before this amendment, this statement thus conflicts with the fulfilment of the requirement of non-obviousness, this inconsistency in the description, including in the drawings, has to be removed.
Coming back to the Agfa/Gucci case, the proprietor has, in its action for infringement, tried to interpret the claim as before it was amended. This not permissible under G 1/25.
Whether the claim is not supported by the description, or whether the description allows to interpret the claim as before the limitation of it due to prior art, it all boils down to the same: the inconsistency between claim and description has to be removed.
In my opinion, all the people ferociously arguing against adaptation of the description seem to forget a fundamental aspect of Art 84. Art 84 does not merely deal with the clarity of the claims as such, but also to the support of the granted claims by the description. Both have to be taken into account.
It is not for nothing that the EBA has made clear in G 1/25 that Art 84 applies both ways and is not restricted to the claims. Following G 1/25, this is now how Art 84 has to be applied.
The day you, and your likes, will have understood this fundamental aspect of Art 84, unnecessary discussions about adaptation of the description between the EPO and applicants/proprietors will belong to the past.
In my opinion, the number of cases in which no adaptation of the description will be required, will be a dwindling minority compared to the vast majority of cases in which the description will need to be adapted. Clinging to § 19 and the like, reminds me of those people clinging to T 56/21 like on a life buoy when they refused the adaptation of the description.
In view of what I have tried to explain to you above here, I am of the opinion the Guidelines F-IV, 4.3, do not need amendment. Even given “that G 1/25 expressly permits the retention of unclaimed embodiments and explicitly rejects the pursuit of purely formal concordance”, when we come to a case of non-unity, the problem is not a problem of formal concordance but rather a problem of substantive consistence.
In any case it is neither mine or your business to tell the EPO how the Guidelines have to adapted. When the time comes, it will be possible to make suggestions, but the final decision on the content of the Guidelines rests with the EPO.
I hope that by now, the penny has dropped. It is getting tiring to repeat again and again something which should be abundantly clear (sorry for the pun) for people having a mind to understand.
Thank you for your response. Given your insistence that paragraph 35 mandates description adaptation for “every amendment to ensure patentability” and your view that the current EPO Guidelines (F-IV, 4.3) require no revision, I decided to look at how other practitioners are interpreting the decision.
As you might expect, many have already weighed in, and the general consensus is that we are in new middle-ground territory. One notable analysis comes from Adam Lacy and Thorsten Bausch of Hoffmann Eitle, published on the Kluwer Patent Blog (“G1/25: two decisions for the price of one?”). They arrive at a very different conclusion than you do.
They point out that G 1/25 explicitly rejects a requirement for description amendment in “each and every case”. Relying on Reasons 19 and 20, they emphasize that the mere presence of embodiments falling outside the amended claims does not constitute an inconsistency unless it leaves the skilled person in “real doubt” about the claim scope. Far from assuming the current regime remains intact, Lacy and Bausch observe that G 1/25 points towards a “much more liberal approach” and expect it to lead the EPO to “relax the current strict and monolithic approach to description adaptation”.
How do you reconcile your claim that Guidelines F-IV, 4.3 require no change, along with your insistence that any excluded embodiment must automatically be deleted or marked, with Lacy and Bausch’s conclusion that the Enlarged Board has struck a “golden middle way” that explicitly rolls back the EPO’s automatic adaptation requirement? I would be very interested to hear your thoughts on their interpretation.
@ Anonymous-07.09.2026,
That other practitioners are interpreting the decision is certainly interesting and I have been following all blogs or publications dealing G 1/25. When one remembers that the majority of amicus curiae briefs were against adaptation of the description, it does not come as surprise that any straw on which the profession can grip will be good for practitioners still refusing the adaptation of the description.
I have explained in other comments on this blog, that clinging on Reasons 19-20 reminds on the amicus curiae clinging to T 56/21. Lacy and Bausch might observe that G 1/25 points towards a “much more liberal approach” and expect it to lead the EPO to “relax the current strict and monolithic approach to description adaptation”. Time will tell whether those hopes will materialise. I am not convinced of it.
I have never defended a brute deletion of embodiments not any longer encompassed by the claims, besides the fact that the original claim only presented two alternatives and one of them was not any longer patentable.
When the description is left unamended after limitation of the claim, any statement left in the description
(i) which raises doubts about the matter for which protection is sought or
(ii) which raises doubts about the embodiments which remain patentable
represent an inconsistency between the claims and the description which has to be removed.
This is the nub of G 1/25 and the rest is irrelevant. That statements not corresponding to these 2 categories can be left untouched is pretty manifest. I would never argue that those have to be removed.
I cannot see in this requirement of the EBA a “much more liberal approach” leading the EPO to “relax the current strict and monolithic approach to description adaptation”. In my opinion, at least during my active time, I have never seen a monolithic approach when it came to adapting the description.
Without the attitude of the applicant in the famous pemetrexed case, the EPO would never have tightened the screws in matters of adaptation of the description. Although only pemetrexed disodium has ever been disclosed, the then applicant previously claimed pemetrexed in general, which faced a justified Art 123(2) objection, as the whole disclosure was limited to pemetrexed disodium during the whole procedure.
In his letter dated March 8th 2006 the applicant wrote the following:
“The passages on pages 3 and 4 have been edited. The Applicant seeks to draw a distinction between subject matter which is relevant to the invention which is indicated as being that to which “the present invention generally relates” and “the subject matter provided by the invention” which is the subject matter claimed. In particular it is highlighted that the reduction of toxicity of the anti-folate in the use of the combination therapy is relevant to the invention and should be retained.”
There was no proof on file, and no attempt by the applicant to bring the proof, that pemetrexed salts other disodium would present the effect claimed.
In my opinion, such a statement would now be prohibited under G 1/25, in view of the claimed limitation to pemetrexed disodium. If the general claim for pemetrexed would have been allowable, which it was not for lack of the corresponding data in the file, and a dependent claim related to pemetrexed disodium, then the above statement could have been, at a pinch, acceptable.
By claiming, in the absence of any proof. that the technical effect was generally available, and not limited to pemetrexed disodium, it left, at the moment of grant, the skilled person in “real doubt” about the claim scope.
That later the UKSC considered infringement by equivalence was irrelevant at the moment of grant. By the way, Lord Neuberger and Sir Robin Jacob did not show a deep knowledge on how added matter is dealt with at the EPO. This is however a different story.
The pemetrexed case was showing an inconsistency between claim and description about the matter for which protection was sought. Moreover, the inconsistency also touched upon Art 123(2). See the order in G 1/25: the inconsistency was such that Art 84 and 123(2) were not complied with.
Robin Jacob used to advise us to learn from the Americans by observing what they have done and learn from it, so as not to make the same mistakes. But in this decision the EBA has driven us all onto the same “patent profanity” rocks that currently bedevil US patent practice. Drafters from now on must , also over here, scrupulously avoid all use in the description of the word “invention”. Write “disclosure” instead. Then, even if the claim gets narrowed, all the examples remain examples of the disclosure even when they are no longer embodiments of the “invention”.
Will this help the courts? I doubt it. Does the EPO now enjoy a mandate to force applicant to sort the examples of the disclosure into two categories, those inside the scope and those outside, even in a case where the claim is in itself clear? I doubt it.
@ Max Drei-06.09.2026,
Do you really think that avoiding all use in the description of the word “invention” and to write “disclosure” instead will do the trick? Reasonable doubts are permitted.
Whatever happens, the claims define the matter for which protection is sought, and whether this matter is defined under “invention” or “disclosure” will not make one iota of difference.
Any statement allowing to raise doubts about the matter for which protection is sought, or which allows to raise doubts about the parts of the description actually representing the inventive teaching once the claim has been limited, will have to be removed.
I found in Lexology a comment of G 1/25, by Gareth Williams of Marks & Clerk saying the following: “…. attorneys will now spend time (and spend applicants’ money) discussing with examiners whether a specific inconsistency gives rise to an actual breach of the EPC, or whether the skilled person would read the claims and description in context to understand the claim wording. This at least seems more useful than mechanically replacing references to “the invention” with “the disclosure”, or inserting statements that subject matter is “disclosed, but not claimed”.”
I have nothing to add, but to say that presently attorneys are already spending “time (and spend applicants’ money) discussing with examiners whether a specific inconsistency gives rise to an actual breach of the EPC….
This is reality and writing “disclosure” instead of “invention” will be about as effective as a plaster on a wooden leg.
I agree with Mr Williams. What he writes and what I wrote are not in contradiction. What defines the invention is (exclusively) the claim. The description has a different role namely to deliver a disclosure that supports and enables the claim. Can disclosure of technology render a claim unclear? Daniel, I still doubt it.
@ Max Drei,
You are playing with words. Whilst I do not speak for the EPO, I fear that with your theory you will not get very far.
A general disclosure of technology with a remote relation to the claim appears superfluous for a start. If your “disclosure” allows to raise doubt about the support of the claims by the description or attempts to circumvent the limitations of the amended claim, it will not fool the EPO and your application will most probably be refused. Calling “disclosure” any embodiment not covered by the claims will not help you in the slightest.
Just try and see the result. If your client is ready to pay an appeal fee and the cost for representation in appeal, why not. At the latest when entering in appeal, I would advise to file an amended description. As it will represent an amendment under Art 12(4) RPBA, some boards will not be inclined to admit it in appeal. The consequence of such an attitude as representative could be devastating for your client.
Daniel just in case I am misunderstood I wish to add a bit more. My description does not contain two categories of example, those of the invention and those merely disclosed Rather, all of them are disclosed and none are said to be of the invention. I am still curious, given the blandishments of G1/25,, where the intolerable inconsistency is, where are the “real doubts” and what provision of the EPC is offended by such a description.
The court found it “immediately apparent” (citing your words) that the chromatic passages were outside the scope of the claims, that is exactly where I read that G1/25 teaches that no amendment is required. No need to repeat your arguments, all readers are aware that you disagree.
What is not clear to me is where you find a difference in the treatment of the description depending on whether the claim was limited to green at filing or to respond to a N or IS objection or to another one. [of course, the example is simplified, thus pls consider colours are clear in the example]
A. Nonymous-07.09.2027,
You show once again a very selective reading of the UPC decision and of my observations, as well as of G 1/25. You did not even try to refute my argumentation. A sweeping statement was enough.
The CFI UPC LD Hamburg had no other way than to realise and acknowledge that that the “chromatic” passages were outside the scope of the claims. But Agfa claimed infringement of “chromatic” although “chromatic” was deleted from the original claim. The court had thus to deal with it.
The acknowledgment that the “chromatic” passages were outside the scope of the claims, did however not withhold the court to add that there “are several passages mentioning “chromatic” in the specification of the patent that “SHOULD HAVE BEEN DELETED”, and to conclude that it is immediately apparent that the “SPECIFICATION IS NOT CONSISTENT” with the granted claims.
Claiming then that “G1/25 teaches that no amendment is required” shows either a deep level of incompetence or an absolute misunderstanding of what G 1/25 has said. You have the choice. I can neither agree not follow such stupid and ludicrous statements.
There is indeed “No need to repeat your arguments, all readers are aware that you disagree” with my reasoning. Please come up with more compelling arguments than playing on words.
Any further comment of yours along the same lines will be deleted. My time and that of the readers is too precious to be wasted.
Double comment deleted
@ Max Drei-07.09.2026-2,
I can reassure you that you were not misunderstood. I will however not repeat in detail what I said before your last comment.
I rather take it that you have misunderstood or at least you refuse to understand that avoiding the use of the word “invention” in the original description will not help you much.
You and your colleagues simply refuse to accept or understand what the EBA said in Reasons 35 ff and in the order. Is this so difficult to understand?
I have noted that all my explanations based on the famous Agfa/Gucci case have not been replied in substance by you or any of your colleagues. The only reply I got was a very partial reading of said decision which amply fails to convince.
I think now the discussion should be over. I let you draw any conclusion you think fit.
I agree. Discussion over.
I must say though, that I am glad that I have retired, so escape the burden of explaining to a client what (if anything) the word “real” means. Real as opposed to “imaginary”, I guess you (and your former colleagues) will say.
Ever since 1973 I have been cautioned against the inclusion of any adjective in a claim. No good will come of it, they told me. And they were right, weren’t they?
@ Max Drei,
I agree with you, that being retired is a rather convenient position.
I am glad that I will not have to explain to examiners what is an inconsistency or what is not. I expect that some of your colleagues will dig their heels in and refuse any amendment. On the other side this attitude will trigger a similar position.
The net result could that applications may be refused, sometimes without good reasons, but, I hope, in most cases with good reasons due to a not adapted description. The applicants will have to file an appeal and this also will induce costs. With the RPBA as they are, and the rather very formalistic position of some boards, applications might be refused for exactly those formal aspects.
I hope that common sense and pragmatism will prevail. The problem is that examiners working mainly in home office, it will be difficult to come to a unified view on this topic within all examiners.
I do also agree with you that bringing adjectives into a claim is a good receipt for problems. Those problems can be compounded when the description contains different definitions for such an adjective. Just look at “gathered”.
Can’t resist it, Daniel, after reading your thoughtful and kind response. One last comment:
Of course, the EPO must strive to reduce to a mimimum any lack of “clarity” as to what is the subject matter for which protection is sought. Following G1/25, one way to do this, upon discovering a degree of clarity that is less than 100%, is to declare that there is an “inconsistency” between the description and the claims. That’s because any inconsistency, however trivial, can be said to introduce “real doubt” as to what the claim “covers” and therefore, following G1/25, it has to be purged from the specification.
In previous postings, I have argued that, using mere words, it is never possible to reach 100% clarity, what the claim “covers” (or indeed, whether the description “supports” the claim or not). I fear therefore that G1/25 will be the basis of a new and even bigger stick with which EPO Examiners can squeeze out any application that they personally find unpersuasive.
We shall see.
@ Anon.-07.09.2026,
Contrary to what you allege, I have not overlooked anything in G 1/25. I simply draw different conclusions from it. .
I have tried to convey to you the idea that any statement left in the description
(i) which raises doubts about the matter for which protection is sought or
(ii) which raises doubts about the embodiments which remain patentable
represent an inconsistency between the claims and the description which has to be removed.
In those two situations it is manifest that
– the matter for which protection is sought is “unclear” in the meaning of Reasons 19 and 35
– doubts about the embodiments which remain patentable arise. Those embodiments are therefore “unclear” in the meaning of Reasons 19 and 35.
In those two situations it is manifest that there is
– a “real doubt as to the meaning of the claim” and
– “it is unclear whether a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments do, or do not fall within the claimed subject matter”.
If you think that in the two above situations everything is “clear”, then I can only invite you once more to look for a job outside the patent world.
The notions I have brought forward should not come as surprise to anybody claiming to be a qualified representative. As you bravely remain anonymous, you should not be surprised to be attacked about your proficiency in the profession. This statement is covered by the notion of freedom of opinion. That you do not like it is, to me, irrelevant.
Any statements left in the description which do not fall under the two categories/situations above do not harm and I agree with the EBA, that no adaptation of the description is then required. Those cases will remain a negligible minority compared to the vast majority of cases in which the description will need to be adapted once the claims have been limited.
I have given “clear” examples on how I think G 1/25 could be interpreted (“green” toy + Agfa/Gucci, now even pemetrexed disodium) you never bothered to take position about. You mainly stick to Reasons 19 and the like. This is getting tiring.
Clinging on Reasons 19 and the like reminds me of La Fontaine’s fable about the frog that wanted to become as big as an ox. In the end, the frog exploded….
I think the topic and my patience are by now exhausted. You “clearly” risk deletion of any further comment in which you repeat your argumentation like a Tibetan praying mill. If you have nothing more intelligent to add, then please keep quiet.
Not sure I understand, Daniel. I thought G1/25 told us that, if we find an inconsistency to be present, we must examine whether it, that is to say, the inconsistency, is the cause of real doubts what the claim covers.
But now you seem to be saying that, whenever I can cobble together an argument that there is less than 100% clarity as to what the claim covers (and any competent EPO Examiner or patent lawyer will always be able to do that), that is enough to establish the fact that an “inconsistency” is present. With all the G1/25 consequences that then follow. Bingo!
I’m worried about the logic. Perhaps putting the cart before the horse? Or falling into the logical trap exemplified by “All dogs have tails. This animal has a tail. Therefore this animal is a dog”.
Anon, you have manifestly not understood or you do not want to understand anything.
Moreover you fully misinterpret G 1/25.
Your comment is therefore deleted.
DXThomas
Max Drei-08.09.2025,
Your comment is rather cryptic to me.
I can agree with you that “G1/25 told us that, if we find an inconsistency to be present, we must examine whether it, that is to say, the inconsistency, is the cause of real doubts what the claim covers.”
I gave examples of a situations in which an inconsistency exists in my reply to Anon-07.09.2026. He did not bother to reply in substance to those examples, but came with the same old rant. This is why I deleted his comment.
Nothing is ever black or white in our profession, but when an inconsistency exists which raises real doubts, any competent EPO Examiner or patent lawyer will always be able to recognise this fact.
For instance, the Agfa/Gucci case is a perfect example in which the description needs adaptation. In this case the real doubt is 100%.
Whether real doubts arise at 51%, or somewhere between 60%-90%, is simply not realistic to announce in advance. We have presently to wait how G 1/25 will be applied by the boards. Anything else is not realistic and worrying about things which could happen in theory but might even never materialise does not make any sense.
In my active life, I never had to refuse an application because the description was not correctly adapted. That the majority of the profession is still against adaptation of the description is a matter of fact, but it is not a reason to come up with lots of theories about this or that as I have seen in this blog and in others.
I therefore do not “fear that G1/25 will be the basis of a new and even bigger stick with which EPO Examiners can squeeze out any application that they personally find unpersuasive”.
This requires a minimum of good will on both sides of the table. Inundating examiners with fallacious arguments as to why the description is not to be adapted, will only induce a corresponding reply from the other side of the table and then we end up nowhere. I do not think that we will suddenly see a surge in the number of refusals due to a description which is not adapted.
As clarity is not a ground of opposition, an opponent has no leg to stand on. In opposition he has to be heard about the adaptation of the description, but at the end of the day it is the deciding body which will say whether the adaptation of the description is acceptable or not.
One aspect of the adaptation of the description is also bringing in the description a factual disclosure of the closest prior art, if the latter has come closer than the one the applicant started with. I refer here as well to H-V, 2.4 and F-II, 4.3. I hope not having opened a new can of worms.
Mr Thomas,
Sorry for this tardy comment, which has actually been triggered by your observations.
The principle of the broadest technically sensible interpretation(“BSI”) is enshrined in the case law of the EPO. I believe it was endorsed albeit implicitly by the EBA in G 1/24. Now, what is its interplay with G 1/25 and its definition of inconsistency ?
I take an example : original claim includes A which is a broadly defined feature covering embodiments A1 and A2 disclosed in the description. Applicant then narrows down A to A’, because the search has found some novelty-defeating prior art. A’ clearly covers embodiment A1 but its wording involves a grey area so that it does not clearly exclude A2. This situation would arguably meet the “real doubt” test of G 1/25 requiring description amendment to delete or disclaim A2.
But applying the BSI would interpret the grey area in the claim so as to cover A2, which would defeat novelty again. The applicant would then be forced to further amend the claim to remove the grey area and limit it more strictly to A1.
Amending the claim in this way would be a much simpler and more efficient way to address the inconsistency than amending the description.
Mr Hagel,
If the claim would be more strictly limited to A1, this would not change the fact that A2 would not correspond to the definition of the matter for which protection is sought. Amendment would be necessary in any case. Even with A’ an amendment appears necessary.
As soon as a claim is amended, there should not be real doubts left about the definition of the matter for which protection is sought.
I would never delete A2, but A2 cannot be left in the description as falling under the claim.
Comment deleted.
Enough is enough.
DXThomas
For clarity, I have put together a head-to-head comparison between the arguments made in your amicus brief and the actual rulings in the G 1/25 decision:
Absolute vs. Result-Oriented Necessity
Your Brief: Asserted that any discrepancy must not benefit the applicant and must be removed, stating that non-covered embodiments “have to be characterised as such… or deleted.”
G 1/25 (Paras 22 & 43): Directly rejected this, ruling that the EPC does not require adaptation “merely for the sake of formal concordance.” Adaptation is only required if the inconsistency has legal significance that leads to EPC non-compliance.
Single Statutory vs. Dynamic Multi-Provision Basis
Your Brief: Argued that Article 84 EPC (and Rule 42(1)(c)) alone is sufficient legal basis for requiring adaptation.
G 1/25 (Para 50): Held that the mandate for adaptation “does not lie in a single provision of the EPC,” but rather depends on whichever specific provision is violated (e.g., Articles 52–57, 76(1), 83, 84, 123).
Non-Covered Embodiments as Inconsistencies
Your Brief (Sec III.1.5): Stated that embodiments no longer falling under the claims must be characterized as such prior to grant.
G 1/25 (Para 20): Explicitly ruled that an inconsistency “is not established merely because the description… contains a technical teaching, examples, or embodiments that do not fall within the claimed subject-matter.”
Elimination of Claim-Like Clauses
Your Brief (Sec III.1.6.7): Argued that claim-like clauses induce uncertainty and “should be deleted before grant or before maintenance in amended form.”
G 1/25 (Para XVII): Acknowledged past case law but established no blanket rule mandating their deletion unless they cause a specific breach of EPC clarity or patentability.
Reliance on UPC Practice
Your Brief: Relied on UPC decisions, arguing adaptation is necessary “for the safety of third parties” and to save post-grant courts from having to adapt descriptions.
G 1/25 (Paras 21 & 44): Declined to base EPC obligations on external court practice, noting that inconsistencies with no direct legal effect on EPC compliance do not demand adaptation.
Given these direct contradictions, I struggle to see how G 1/25 aligns with your opinion, as the decision explicitly rejects the practices you advocate. We will likely need to wait for the first Board of Appeal decision on this issue to see how it is applied in practice, unless the EPO proactively issues significant revisions to its examination guidelines
@ who knows!-11.09.2026
What aim are you pursuing with your latest rant? If you intend to convince myself that adaptation of the description is consigned to the dustbin of history, you are mistaken.
I moreover note a severely distorted analysis of G 1/25 on your side.
I agree with Reasons 22 & 43 in G 1/25 and I have no problems with it.
I also agree with Reason 50 in G 1/25 and I have no problem with it. I simply wish to draw your attention that Art 84 is named expressis verbis in G 1/25. If the claims are not properly supported by the description, the inconsistency has to be removed. Have you read Reason 35 dealing expressis verbis with Art 84?
I agree with Reason 20 in G 1/25 and I have no problems with it. Have you ever read Reasons 21 and 38?
Para XVII of G 1/25 relate to facts and submissions and is thus irrelevant as such for the decision. In T 56/21 and T 1444/20 claim like clauses were considered admissible. As T 56/21 and T 1444/20 belong to the second line of case law, which has been clearly dismissed in G 1/25, it appears logical that claim like clauses are not any longer acceptable. To me, they introduce a flagrant inconsistency. For the rest, I refer to T 0749/00, even if T 0438/22 says the contrary.
In T 0438/22, the board nevertheless agreed with the long established case law of the boards that “supported by the description” means requiring the entirety of the description to be consistent with any claims found to meet the requirements of the EPC. This is exactly what G 1/25 says.
I further agree with Reasons 21 & 44 in G 1/25 and have no problems with it. I am not so naïve as to think that an obiter in a UPC decision has the slightest binding effect on the EBA or on any board of appeal of the EPO. I just took it as an example to show that in its decision, the UPC LD Hamburg severely criticised the fact that “chromatic” was not deleted before grant.
If you think that in that situation “chromatic” did not have to be deleted, then no adaptation will ever be necessary. I remind you that Agfa took pretext of “chromatic” being left in the description, to claim infringement of a feature which had been deleted in the granted claim. This is certainly not what G 1/25 has decided.
If you struggle to see how G 1/25 aligns with my opinion, then it is your problem, not mine. If you think that G 1/25 explicitly rejects the practices I advocate, you better change your glasses and/or adopt a holistic approach of G 1/25. You cling for not having to adapt the description invoking very specific parts of it, like those refusing the adaptation of the description clung to T 56/21 and Art 84 only to be applied to the claims and not the description.
We will certainly have to wait for decisions of the boards. However, I doubt that the practice of adapting the description will substantially change after G 1/25. I also doubt that the EPO will “proactively” issue significant revisions to its examination guidelines.
After all, in spite of your pseudo, you seem to know very little and you seem obsessed by avoiding to adapt the description at any rate. If your clients are prepared to pay for an appeal and the corresponding costs, you can try it. Success not guaranteed.
I take the opportunity to invite you look at my further blog entry on G 1/25. As Max Drei defined it, I have been looking at G 1/25 like “a moderately intelligent and well -informed reader of a B publication that includes mention of the relevant prior art, and with a mind willing to understand”.
the night the privileges were abolished, is not it rather 4th August 1789 ?
@ Olivier,
Vous avez tout à fait raison.
J’ai rajouté ce commentaire le 4 septembre, d’où mon erreur. Celle-ci a été rectifiée.